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| von_Guo |
Posted - 05/17/2009 : 15:46:35
巴基斯坦與神學仕的關係
巴基斯坦神學仕佔據了整個 Swat 河谷區 距離伊斯蘭馬巴德僅100公里餘
一說有上百萬的難民逃離Swat 河谷區 因為巴國政府軍正與神學仕交火中
巴基斯坦當初扶植神學仕對抗蘇聯入侵阿富汗 9/11之後神學仕遁回巴基斯坦 老美沒把它當回事
阿富汗神學仕遁回巴基斯坦的地區是一塊巴基斯坦政府從來無法行使管轄權的化外之地 從北到南共500哩七塊相連的部落區
巴基斯坦政府靠得是由情報機關與其談條件 利益交換維持關係
部落區9/11之後在巴基斯坦境內製造恐怖活動 包括暗殺穆沙拉夫
美國當時在阿富汗境內追勦基地組織 美國經援巴基斯坦的穆沙拉夫
巴基斯坦政府用美國經援安撫部落區 部落區拿了錢要還債基地組織 因為基地組織資助了部落區
美國經援巴基斯坦的穆沙拉夫前後共花了五十億
公視video: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/view/
http://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-Building-Afghanistan/dp/0670019704/ref=wl_it_dp?ie=UTF8&coliid=IZAWEHLPLFH46&colid=333YCWSRPNE2H
上書作者回答了記者六個問題 第一個最長 譯成如下
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Inside the Pakistan-Taliban Relationship: Six Questions for Ahmed Rashid, Author of Descent Into Chaos
By Scott Horton
http://harpers.org/archive/2008/07/hbc-90003347
July 30, 3:41 PM, 2008
The CIA, we learned in a report today, has compiled damning evidence of the Pakistani military’s complicity with the Taliban. But this is hardly news. Indeed, one analyst has repeatedly warned that Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf and his intelligence service have been taking America for a ride, pretending to support U.S. counter-terrorism operations while sheltering and supporting the Taliban and numerous other extremist organizations. That analyst is Ahmed Rashid, and he is the most articulate of the observers of the region between the Oxus and the shores of Karachi. Based in Lahore, Rashid combines scholarly excellence with popular appeal, as demonstrated by his book on the Taliban, which is Yale University Press’s all-time best-seller. Rashid’s latest book, Descent into Chaos pulls back the cover on American operations in Afghanistan, which were hampered from the outset by chronic bad judgment on the part of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney.
穆沙拉夫(Pervez Musharraf)和他的情報部門打從開頭（按：2001/Sep/11）就在耍老美 巴基斯坦暗中包庇神學仕（塔里班，Taliban）和許多恐佈組織 CIA知之 但改變不了現實 本篇乃訪問暢銷書《 Descent into Chaos》作者 Ahmed Rashid 的六項答問
1. You see Americans as hopelessly naïve in their dealings with Pakistan. The Americans did not fully appreciate the patron-client role between Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and the Taliban, and they seemed prepared to accept President of Pakistan Pervez Musharaff’s various assurances at face value. You note that the Bush Administration did not see the important role played by democratic political groupings like the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which came to power on a groundswell of anger brought about by behind-the-scenes conniving between the military and terrorist organizations and the Taliban. Later, Condoleezza Rice’s State Department did advocate a strategic shift towards open elections and at times seemed somewhat partial to the PPP–but it doesn’t seem that Rice’s voice always carried the day. Why was the Bush Administration so blind to these problems?
你指出美國人在與巴基斯坦打交道時令人絕望地天真 美國人根本搞不清巴國情報局（ISI ，Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate）與神學仕之間千絲萬縷的瓜葛 也貌似樂於接受穆沙拉夫總統的任何口頭保證 布希政府忽視巴國內部由於泉湧的民憤而上台的民主政党如巴基斯坦人民党（PPP ，Pakistan People’s Party） 民憤起於軍方、恐佈組織、神學仕在幕後的頏瀣一氣 蛇鼠一窩。 稍後 雖國務卿萊斯轉向鼓吹公平選舉 且時而言辭偏袒PPP 但萊斯似乎並不被PPP領情。 何以布希政府如此瞎眼？
Ahmed Rashid
The problem was that after the war ended in 2001 the U.S. focus was entirely on Al Qaeda. The United States did not really care what happened to the Taliban, who in large numbers, including the leadership, came to seek shelter in Pakistan. U.S. diplomats kept telling me they were not interested in the Taliban until 2006 when the insurgency was well under way.
問題起於2001阿富汗戰爭結束之後 美國人全神貫注在基地組織 美國那時沒把神學仕當回事 而後者大批來到巴基斯坦尋求庇護 美國外交官一直告訴我對神學仕沒興趣 直到2006盜賊蠭起時才改口
The Pakistani military was stunned at the lackadaisical attitude of the Americans in mopping up Al Qaeda, and the U.S. failure to commit ground troops in the south and then at Tora Bora convinced the Pakistani army that the Americans were not serious, that they preferred that the Northern Alliance militias do their fighting for them. Pakistani officers told me they were amazed that Rumsfeld would not put even one thousand U.S. soldiers into battle. The ISI sent memos to Musharraf stating that the Americans would not stay long in Afghanistan and that the Taliban should be kept alive.
巴國軍方驚訝於老美掃蕩基地組織的有一搭沒一搭 而老美不願在南部地區和在Tora Bora部署地面部隊也促使巴國軍方相信老美不重視南部狀況 老美寧願教北方聯盟為其代勞 巴軍軍官說他們訝異倫斯斐（Rumsfeld）甚至不願投入1,000名戰鬥人員 ISI投遞備忘錄給倫斯斐 聲明美國不會久留阿富汗 所以神學仕宜予保留
This lack of U.S. interest coincided with the interests of the Pakistani army: to go after Al Qaeda, but to allow the Taliban to resettle in Pakistan. Quite soon the Taliban was once again patronized by the ISI. The reason was that the Pakistani army was deeply offended by the Bonn agreement, which actually gave all power to the Northern Alliance–who were deemed the enemies of Pakistan and the Taliban because they had been backed in the civil war by India, Russia, and Iran (the regional opponents of the Taliban and Pakistan during the 1990s decade-long civil war in Afghanistan).
美國之對於神學仕之缺乏興趣 恰與巴國軍方之利益不謀而合： 追討基地組織 但容許神學仕滯留巴基斯坦 沒多久 神學仕遂再度蒙受ISI的庇護 這原因出於巴國軍方當時對Bonn協議甚感不悅：該協議將行動大權旁落給北方聯盟 而北方聯盟又因九零年代在阿富汗十年內戰中和印俄伊朗站在一邊而和巴國軍方和神學仕成為仇人
Later, India asserted itself in Afghanistan by opening an embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan and then announced a large reconstruction program in Pakistan. Pakistan’s military told the West that Indian influence was undermining Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and also subverting Pakistan by funding and supporting the Baloch insurgency in Balochistan province. Today India’s presumed influence in Afghanistan is the principle gripe of the military. I think the Americans knew quite early what was going on between the military and the Taliban, but were prepared to ignore it as long as Musharraf helped out with Al Qaeda and as long as the United States remained bogged down in Iraq.
稍後 印度籍由設立一個大使和四個領事館伸手介入阿富汗 並宣佈要在巴基斯坦推動一個大規模的興建計劃 巴國軍方告訴外界 印度在阿富汗的影響力妨礙了巴基斯坦在阿富汗的利益 同時藉資助Balochistan省的粄亂活動顛覆巴基斯坦 今天印度在阿富汗的影響力主要是掌握阿富汗軍方 而老美很早就知道巴國軍方和神學仕之間的勾搭 但準備好接受事實 只要穆沙拉夫協助追剿基地 並且只要老美身陷伊拉克
That was the principle blindness of the Bush Administration. I describe the ISI’s two-tracked approach in my book: While part of the ISI assisted the Bush Administration, furnishing it with self-serving but at times useful intelligence, the ISI created another, covert section to run its Taliban-support operations. Those who carefully studied the situation were onto this for some time, and I detail it in my book, but the U.S. intelligence agencies have only now issued their study reaching these fairly obvious conclusions—dangerously late in the game.
那是布希政府主要的盲點 我在書中描述了ISI的兩手策略： 當個一部門在提供對本身有用但偶爾對布希政府有用的情報 又開設了另一個秘密部門去支援神學士 研析這情況的人都花了相當多時間 我也寫在我的書上 但美國情報部門只到現在才發佈它們自己的結論 在這場較勁上危險地晚了
In 2006-2007 the United States started to realize that the Musharraf system was unsustainable in the long term, and began to tilt towards some kind of transition of power away from Musharraf and the Pakistani army. The United States desired a transition to a limited degree of civilian rule as long as Musharraf stayed on to oversee the army and continued to chase Al Qaeda. That is when the State Department opened a dialogue with Benazir Bhutto, and with the PPP, which it had studiously ignored until then.
2006~2007 美國開始體認與穆沙拉夫體系合作不是長遠之計 美國意欲過渡到談些有限的人權 只要穆沙拉夫不因此垮台 仍能在位監督軍方與追勦基地 這樣 美國開始與Benazir Bhutto並與PPP對話 美國此前一直忽略後者
Until then the Bush Administration’s major policy decisions were run out of Vice President Dick Cheney’s office with the help of Donald Rumsfeld. Cheney had a warm and personal relationship with Musharraf and did not want to see the United States take on the Pakistani army when the United States was so preoccupied with Iraq. I write about a key incident in 2001, when Cheney cleared a secret Pakistani airlift of ISI personnel from Kunduz who had been helping the Taliban and who were stuck in northern Afghanistan. That was a big plus for Musharraf with the army–that he could get the Americans to save the lives of ISI personnel even in the midst of the U.S. attack on Afghanistan. And when Musharraf held a rigged referendum to become president in 2002, followed by rigged elections, the Americans did not say a word.
直到那時之前 布希政府的策略決定都出自錢尼與倫斯斐 錢尼和穆沙拉夫私交甚篤 而不願看到美國與伊拉克糾纏之際又槓上巴基斯坦軍方 我寫到一件在2001不算小的事件 錢尼將一位巴基斯坦情報人員祕密空運出Kunduz 此位仁兄當時正在幫神學仕 而神學仕當時正被困為在阿富汗北部 那事件對穆沙拉夫與軍方的關係上是一個加分 ”瞧 我能教老美弄出一個ISI的人 即便美軍正在攻打該地” 而當穆沙拉夫在2002舞弊當選總統 爾後的選舉中繼續舞弊 美國都不吭一聲
A year after 9/11 it was clear to many Pakistanis that Musharraf’s support of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan was not the promised strategic U-turn that would end the army’s long-standing support to Islamic extremists but rather a short-term tactical move to appease the United States and offset India’s hegemony. The near-war with India in 2002, the freedom given to the Kashmiri and Pakistani militant groups, and the refusal to grapple with homegrown terrorism created serious misgivings among liberal Pakistanis about Musharraf’s ultimate intentions. The Bush Administration did not question Musharraf as long as the Pakistani army cooperated.
9/11之後一年內 很多巴基斯坦人都看出穆沙拉夫對美國主導的阿富汗戰爭的支持並不是答應將巴國軍方長久以來支持伊斯蘭恐怖主義的政策來個急轉彎 而只是一個短期的戰術調整來安撫美國和抗衡一下印度的霸權 2002與印度一觸即發的戰爭危機 給予喀什米爾和巴基斯坦境內民兵組織的自由 對國內日增的恐怖活動拒予打壓 引發自由派巴基斯坦人仕嚴重擔憂穆沙拉夫葫蘆裡到底賣的是什麼藥 布希政府倒是不加聞問 只要穆沙拉夫壓得住軍隊
Ｅven when NATO troops began to deploy in Afghanistan in 2005–2006, and asked the United States to rein in Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, the United States continued to promise that they would get tough with Pakistan but never did. A big change came when the U.S. military became much more assertive in criticizing the links between the Taliban and ISI, but that happened only after Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert Gates, who allowed U.S. generals a much greater say.
即便在2005~2006 北約開始在阿富汗部署 要求美國施壓巴基斯坦收斂一下與神學仕的關係 美國回應將會對巴基斯坦硬起來 但美國從未這麼作 大轉變唯有到美軍變堅決抨擊ISI與神學仕的關係時才發生 但那也是等到倫斯斐被Robert Gates取代之後的事 Gates允許美國將軍多些發言權
Then the positions of both the Defense and State Departments converged–there was a need for some kind of political transition away from the military–but perhaps it was too late, because the Taliban were too well ensconced in Afghanistan and in their bases in Pakistan. Moreover, by then the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda had helped radicalize the Pashtun tribesmen on the Pakistani side of the border. That led to the creation of the Pakistani Taliban and complicated the picture even further.
到那時候 美國防部與國務院立場才趨合流 那是需要一點政治不再干預軍事 但恐怕為時已晚 因為神學仕已在阿富汗藏好身 並在巴基斯坦安頓好根據地 此外 到那時 阿富汗的神學仕和基地組織已基本教義化了巴基斯坦境內的Pashtun族 那也衍生出了巴基斯坦的神學仕 將問題進一步複雜化了
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