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新手上路
200 Posts |
 Posted - 02/28/2005 : 02:47:30
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| 本討論串係關於伊朗的核武事件, 請各位先進幫忙張貼新聞與討論. |
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新手上路
200 Posts |
Posted - 02/28/2005 : 02:49:03
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http://letters.washingtonpost.com/W1RH043A585D5CF00287D3CD5AEF90
Iran Was Offered Nuclear Parts
Secret Meeting in 1987 May Have Begun Program
By Dafna Linzer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, February 27, 2005; Page A01
International investigators have uncovered evidence of a secret meeting 18 years ago between Iranian officials and associates of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan that resulted in a written offer to supply Tehran with the makings of a nuclear weapons program, foreign diplomats and U.S. officials familiar with the new findings said.
The meeting, believed to have taken place in a dusty Dubai office in 1987, kick-started Tehran's nuclear efforts and Khan's black market. Iran, which was at war with Iraq then, bought centrifuge designs and a starter kit for uranium enrichment. But Tehran recently told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it turned down the chance to buy the more sensitive equipment required for building the core of a bomb.
There is evidence, however, that Iran used the offer as a buyer's guide, acquiring some of the pricier items elsewhere, officials said.
"The offer is the strongest indication to date that Iran had a nuclear weapons program, but it doesn't prove it completely," said one Western diplomat who is familiar with the details of the offer and would comment on the investigation only on the condition of anonymity. Much of the equipment that Iran obtained can be used for peaceful purposes and is scattered throughout Iran's energy program.
Iran insists that its nuclear activities are aimed at producing nuclear energy, and IAEA inspectors have not found any weapons program underway now. The Bush administration charges that Iran is using the energy program as a cover for a secret effort to build nuclear weapons.
Although the latest discoveries shed no light on Iran's current activities, diplomats believe they provide the most significant public information to date regarding Tehran's interest over the years in nuclear weapons technology and its possible intentions. The White House often focuses on those two areas when trying to explain why Iran should face greater international pressure.
After prodding by the IAEA, Iran turned over a copy of the offer last month. Its contents, along with details of the Dubai meeting, were substantiated in interviews conducted by the agency in recent months, according to diplomats who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the investigation.
The information comes as the IAEA's probe of Iran's nuclear program enters its third year. Tomorrow, the IAEA's 35-member board will meet in Vienna, as it does every three months, to discuss Iran's case and the agency's latest lines of inquiry.
The Bush administration has tried unsuccessfully at board meetings to persuade members to send Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council, which has the authority to impose sanctions or an oil embargo.
Some U.S. officials familiar with limited details of the new intelligence believe it could strengthen the case for U.N. referral. But the new information is unlikely to sway Britain, France and Germany from a negotiating path they began with Iran in November. European diplomats, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that although the new information reinforces suspicions, it is not enough to take the issue to the Security Council -- a move that would likely end their process with Iran.
Since November, Iran's uranium enrichment facilities, which could be used to make the key ingredient for a bomb, have been shut down and are under constant IAEA monitoring as part of Tehran's deal with the three European powers. Iranian officials have said the suspension will continue as long as there is progress in negotiations.
For Europe, the deal is meant to avert a crisis over Iran's nuclear program by finding diplomatic, rather than military, options. President Bush indicated during a trip to Europe last week that he would be willing to consider ways to assist the diplomatic process, although some of his top aides have long expressed concern that such a move would only strengthen Iran's clerical government.
Over the last two years, the IAEA has uncovered an 18-year-old nuclear program, which the Iranians began in secret and in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But because much of the equipment can be used for energy development and there is no evidence of past weapons work, the violations are technical and based on Iran's not reporting the program.
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said recently that there is no new evidence to suggest Iran is working on a nuclear weapons program. But he gave no indication in an interview on Feb. 15 that the 1987 offer had been discovered weeks earlier and was being considered as a new development in the investigation.
"There's not much happening on the nuclear file," he said then. But he made clear that the IAEA had learned much about Iran's programs over the years. "Iran tried to cover up many of their activities, and they learned the hard way."
Aides, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said ElBaradei is expected to report to the board that Iran is honoring a suspension of its nuclear-related activities, as it committed to do in a deal it signed last year with European powers. But he also plans to chide the Islamic Republic for breaking the spirit of the accord. Since it was signed in November, Iran has carried out limited uranium-conversion work, quality control tests and maintenance on some equipment, and is constructing tunnels near a nuclear facility for storing materials in case of an attack.
Beyond monitoring the suspension, the IAEA's investigation into the black market network that supplied Libya and Iran has led to several new lines of inquiry on Iran's program.
Inspectors began pursuing the 1987 information in November. Several details have since come to light, but inspectors still lack a coherent picture.
Diplomats believe the Dubai meeting was attended by as many as three Iranian officials, a Sri Lankan businessman named Mohamed Farouq who was friendly with Pakistan's Khan, and a German named Heinz Mebus, who was one of Khan's original suppliers. Mebus is deceased and Farouq's whereabouts are unknown.
Khan's network of nuclear manufacturers and suppliers stretched across more than 30 countries and sold goods to Iran, Libya and North Korea. He was put out of business in 2003, mostly as a result of the Iran investigation and the exposure of Libya's now-dismantled weapons program.
Farouq's nephew, B.S. Tahir, is in jail in Malaysia for his role in the network and its sales to Libya. Tahir was recently questioned by IAEA officials and by the CIA, U.S. and foreign diplomats involved in the Khan investigations said.
Khan, who often sold his products through friends and intermediaries while he ran Pakistan's nuclear program, did not attend the meeting. He and several associates are under house arrest in Pakistan and are off-limits to U.S. and foreign interrogators.
But the IAEA learned enough about the meeting to prod Iran again about the offer, and last month Iranian official produced a copy for inspectors.
Two Western diplomats familiar with its contents described it as a five-point, phased plan in which the network offered to supply Iran with drawings for Pakistani centrifuges and then a starter kit of one or two centrifuges. Phase three included as many as 2,000 centrifuges, which could be used to enrich bomb-grade uranium. Auxiliary items for the centrifuges and enrichment process would have been delivered afterward, followed by reconversion and casting equipment for building the core of a bomb.
Khan and his associates stood to gain millions from the sales, but the agency believes Iran outsmarted the dealers by buying much of the equipment and technology at lower prices from European, Russian and Chinese competitors during the early 1990s. The equipment was used for programs that could develop nuclear energy, and there is no evidence the materials were assembled in a manner consistent with bomb-building.
"Iran had its own procurement network and bought a lot of stuff themselves," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, who has monitored the Iran and the Khan investigations. "But this offer would also show that even this early on, Pakistan was willing to go the extra mile to help Iran get the bomb. Maybe Iran didn't take the offer, maybe Pakistan wanted too much money, but what's new is that Iran got a guide, and if you have a guide it's a lot easier to do." |
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新手上路
200 Posts |
Posted - 03/01/2005 : 13:18:48
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http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR3/2534933.shtml
誘伊朗棄核武 美擬給甜頭
編譯董更生／華盛頓郵報華盛頓二十八日電
美國高級官員說，布希政府即將決定加入歐洲的行列，對伊朗提供讓其加入世界貿易組織等誘因，以換取伊朗正式同意放棄發展核武。
布希廿四日從歐洲返國後，次日即會見他的外交團隊，討論德國總理施洛德和法國總統席哈克的要求。預料本周還會有更多的討論，白宮要迅速敲定可以提供給伊朗的誘因，以便歐洲與伊朗談判。
布希政府願與伊朗接觸，這種意願即使只是間接的，都是重大改變。美國以前認為伊朗違反國際禁止核子擴散條約，不值得任何獎勵。布希上周與歐洲領袖的會談使他相信，與歐洲聯合對付伊朗比較有效。
美國國務院官員說：「總統在歐洲時，發現他們的立場很堅定，就是伊朗不能有核武。他因此比較願意跟歐洲討論如何跟他們合作，和歐洲可以給伊朗什麼誘因。」
白宮的討論有很多重要意義。在布希第一任時，他的外交團隊對於如何對付伊朗意見嚴重分歧，結果使白宮沒有正式的對伊朗政策。
現在，布希政府似乎願意至少在短期內跟伊朗接觸，以控制其核能計畫不變成軍事用途。
白宮的會議還顯示布希願意與歐洲修好。一名資深白宮官員說：「在歐洲的會談真的很好。我們現在能抓住問題。」
伊朗堅稱其核子計畫只用於發電，但美國不信。歐洲多年來即表示，若無美國參與，伊朗不可能簽署核子協定，尤其是美國在伊朗的鄰國阿富汗和伊拉克駐有數以萬計的部隊，在附近海域又有很多戰艦駐防。
【2005/03/01 聯合報】 |
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新手上路
200 Posts |
Posted - 03/01/2005 : 13:24:05
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http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110504+112005030100069,00.html
2005.03.01 中國時報
交換伊朗非核化 美決先給「胡蘿蔔」
潘勛/綜合華盛頓廿八日外電報導
美國高級官員今天表示，布希總統政府可望支持歐洲盟邦的提案，釋出准許加入「世界貿易組織」、出售軍用民用飛機零件等誘因，換取伊朗正式同意停止發展核子武器的計畫。
俄羅斯昨日同意提供燃料棒給伊朗民用核能電廠，交換德黑蘭當局保證把使用過的廢棄燃料棒歸還。莫斯科當局堅稱，如此可以令伊朗不製造核武。同一天，美國官員便透露美國與其歐洲盟邦提案的細節，並表示，美方已接近同意此一措施。
布希總統本周之內將進行多場會商，白宮方面有意加快行動，敲定誘因清單，俾歐洲與伊朗談判時，提供給德黑蘭當局。
布希政府原本堅持伊朗接受《禁止核子武器擴散條約》約束，停止發展核武才是合法，不該有任何獎賞，但目前此一立場顯然有重大轉變。與歐洲盟邦上周多次會談以後，布希已被說服，相信戰線統一，先提供胡蘿蔔；假如伊朗還不肯遵行，再動用棒子，如此作法會更有效益。
要求匿名的國務院高級官員表示，布希總統在歐洲時發現，盟邦就大原則方面與美國同調，即伊朗不能擁有核武；既然戰略相同，那麼布希便更有意願與歐洲友邦討論戰術層面，包括美國該怎麼與歐洲合作、歐洲能提供什麼讓美方也參與的計畫。
白宮外交政策幕僚的集會也反應出，美方有意向歐洲釋出善意，修補大西洋兩岸因美國出兵伊拉克而受損的邦誼，而且不只口頭說說，也有具體行動。
伊朗向來堅稱自己的核子計畫純為發電，但是美方認為以該國巨大的石油蘊藏量，根本沒必要發展核電。
美方原先拒絕英、法、德等歐洲盟邦提案，不與伊朗就解除核武進行談判，結果證實美方立場並無成果；美歐官員表示，美方以前的作法，使美國看起來比伊朗更像是會在外交斡旋中出局。
去年布希總統連任成功後，其最堅定盟友英國首相布萊爾即向他施壓，要布希加入歐洲的行動；就算美國事實上還是站在局外，也要擺擺樣子，讓外界覺得美方確實支持歐洲與伊朗的談判。而且，最大的賣點乃在，美歐雙邊齊一步調，對美國有利，要是歐洲與伊朗談判失敗，那麼華府不會被視為攪局的外人，而且要對德黑蘭採取懲罰措施之際，會有更多選項。 |
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新手上路
200 Posts |
Posted - 03/01/2005 : 13:27:56
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http://letters.washingtonpost.com/W1RH043A6A5C9CF00287D3CD22A7E0
Bush Weighs Offers To Iran
U.S. Might Join Effort to Halt Nuclear Program
By Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, February 28, 2005; Page A01
The Bush administration is close to a decision to join Europe in offering incentives to Iran -- possibly including eventual membership in the World Trade Organization -- in exchange for Tehran's formal agreement to surrender any plans to develop a nuclear weapon, according to senior U.S. officials.
The day after returning from Europe, President Bush met Friday afternoon with the principal members of his foreign policy team to discuss requests made by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac in particular. More discussions are expected this week, but the White House wants to move quickly to finalize a list of incentives to offer Tehran as part of European talks with Iran, officials said.
The new willingness to engage, even if indirectly, marks a significant change from a position that Iran deserved no rewards for actions it is legally bound to take under terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But Bush's talks last week convinced him that a united front -- in offering carrots now and a stick later if Iran does not comply -- would be more effective, U.S. and European officials say.
"The reason we're comfortable considering this tactically is because strategically, when the president was in Europe, he found them solid on the big issue: that Iran can't have a nuclear weapon. Having found them firm on the strategic issue, he's more willing to consider the tactical aspects with the Europeans -- including how do we work with them and what can the Europeans offer that we would be part of it," said a senior State Department official speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive diplomacy.
The White House discussions have importance on several levels. During Bush's first term, the administration was deeply divided over what to do about Iran, effectively leaving the White House without a formal policy. The debate ranged from adopting the Iraq model of promoting government change to the North Korean model of containing a government and creating incentives to use in diplomatic talks on disarmament.
Now, the administration appears willing, at least in the short term, to hold out the prospect of tentative engagement with Iran down the road to get the Islamic republic to cooperate in limiting its nuclear energy program -- and ensuring it is not subverted for military use.
The White House meeting also reflects an interest in demonstrating to the Europeans that the U.S. effort to heal the transatlantic rift extends beyond tone to substance -- over the issue that most urgently and widely divides the allies.
"The meetings in Europe were really good, not just atmospherics," said a second senior administration official who requested anonymity. "We are past the point of grousing about the process or each other and we're now grappling with the issues: how to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and how to deal with its behavior."
Iran insists its nuclear program is aimed only at producing energy. But the United States worries that Tehran's efforts are a cover for a nuclear weapons program. The Washington Post reported yesterday that international investigators found evidence in 1987 that Iran was offered plans for a nuclear weapons program, but Iranian officials said they did not follow through on buying the equipment needed to build the core of a bomb.
The Europeans have argued for years that Iran was unlikely to commit to a permanent agreement on its nuclear technology without direct or indirect U.S. involvement, especially because the United States has thousands of troops deployed in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan as well as warships and warplanes on other frontiers.
U.S. resistance to proposals by Britain, France and Germany, which are leading the disarmament talks with Iran, proved to be counterproductive, U.S. and European officials said, because they often made the United States, rather than Iran, appear to be the odd man out diplomatically.
In talks after Bush's reelection late last year, British Prime Minister Tony Blair pressed Bush to join or endorse the European approach, according to U.S. and European sources.
"He said, 'Even if you stand apart, take an approach that is seen as reinforcing what we're doing, give the impression that you're empowering us,' " said another U.S. official familiar with the talks.
The biggest selling point, he added, was the argument that charting a common course would help the United States: If talks with Iran fail, Washington would not be seen as the outside player that ruined the effort. There would also then be more options to stand together in punitive steps against Iran, including going to the U.N. Security Council -- a move the United States has long sought.
A united Iran strategy could prevent a repeat of the divisive experience of the U.S. invasion of Iraq over its alleged weapons of mass destruction and its costly impact on transatlantic relations.
The incentives under active consideration are also not major concessions, U.S. and European officials note. "The kind of [economic and political] changes required for membership in the World Trade Organization are very much what we'd want to see anyway," the State Department official said. "So it's not giving Iran something. It's making clear this could lead to that, if they comply."
And even if Iran did fully comply on its nuclear program, it would still take many years to accede to WTO membership because of the time required to radically restructure Tehran's economy, European officials say.
"We're profoundly skeptical that Iran is going to do anything, but we do want to do whatever we can do to help the Europeans succeed," the State Department official said. "And if Iran did comply, there would still be a lot to talk about even at that stage before Iran got WTO membership."
The European proposal, the U.S. official added, lets Washington take steps without changing its basic assessment of Iran's government. It also allows the president to keep all options on the table.
The United States is also considering the European suggestion to facilitate Iran's access to spare airplane parts for its aging passenger fleet as well as other unspecified proposals, U.S. and European officials say. The senior administration official said the White House is still working out the "right mix" and timing of incentives.
The White House discussion about incentives signals a willingness in principle to engage with Iran after a quarter century of diplomatic hostility. During Bush's first term, the United States talked with Iran under U.N. auspices about Afghanistan and al Qaeda, but the contacts quickly broke down over the long-standing issues of Iran's ties to extremists, concerns about weapons of mass destruction and Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process.
U.S. officials expect Bush to make a decision soon after Friday's meeting with key cabinet members involved in foreign policy and Vice President Cheney participating by video conference. "There's no timetable," the State Department official said, "but we're looking for a decision." |
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巫莫夫
剛剛入門
Taiwan
47 Posts |
Posted - 03/01/2005 : 17:39:14
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以下是筆者自身的分析......
伊朗進行核武開發的動機大致上可分為以下4點：
1.確保對伊拉克的傳統戰力與大規模毀滅性武器之嚇阻力。
2.作為削減美國對西亞影響力的手段。
3.作為與以色列的核武以及傳統武器的抗衡手段。
4.保有在亞洲的大國象徵。
第1點對伊拉克的嚇阻所考量的因素如下：伊朗和伊拉克雙方是為了想成為西亞霸權，而在過去曾幾度發生紛爭的仇敵，另外，從1980年9月至1988年7月的兩伊戰爭中伊拉克對伊朗使用化學武器，在波灣戰爭結束後，UNSCOM透過到伊拉克進行大規模毀滅性武器的檢查使得伊拉克不僅是化學武器的製造計畫，連核武與生物武器的開發情形變得較為明顯，由此，為了要勝過伊拉克的武器開發，伊朗開發核武也是自然的趨勢，在2004年海珊政權垮台後，伊朗對伊拉克的擔憂也隨之減弱。
第2點對美國的戰略所考量的因素如下：在2001年9月11日美國同時發生多起恐怖攻擊事件後，華府便出兵攻打阿富汗，結果使得巴基斯坦與前蘇聯加盟共和國的塔吉克與土庫曼斯坦等國境內有美軍基地的建設，再加上現今美國在伊拉克境內的軍事活動，因此西亞對美國的影響力是特別的強，該地區是世界性的石油生產地帶，對以石油產業作為主要產業的伊朗來說，美國的駐軍是個重要問題，此外在1979年後美國對伊朗採取單方面的經濟制裁，對以什麼樣的形式解決這制裁方策也是必要的，因此伊朗認為核武作為削減美國在西亞的影響力方面具有十足的價值。
第3點對以色列的戰略所考量的因素如下：以色列是中東地區裡傳統戰力最強大的國家，雖然以色列本身對保有核武的態度很曖昧，但世界各國已承認以色列是個實際的擁核國家，以其人之道還以其人之身(擁有核武來對抗以色列)是阿拉伯世界共同的目標，對沒有參與伊斯蘭會議組織的伊朗理所當然也是這麼認為，最後，在核武被發明之後，它便成為國際社會的大國象徵，伊朗為獲得開闢這種環境的手段，開發及擁有核武的事也是自然的趨勢。
伊朗取得核武的管道可分為以下4點：
1.從前蘇聯加盟共和國非法取得。
2.在海外祕密取得核武原料等相關物質並在本國開發。
3.接受俄羅斯與中共等國的支援後在本國開發。
4.所有的技術物資都由本國開發。
#51312;#49440;#48124;#51452;#51452;#51032;#51064;#48124;#44277;#54868;#44397; #44397;#48169;#50948;#50896;#54924;
King of the DPRK
International Military Fans Society |
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新手上路
200 Posts |
Posted - 03/09/2005 : 16:25:54
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http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/09/international/09weapons.html?th
Data Is Lacking on Iran's Arms, U.S. Panel Says
By DOUGLAS JEHL and ERIC SCHMITT
Published: March 9, 2005
ASHINGTON, March 8 - A commission due to report to President Bush this month will describe American intelligence on Iran as inadequate to allow firm judgments about Iran's weapons programs, according to people who have been briefed on the panel's work.
The report comes as intelligence agencies prepare a new formal assessment on Iran, and follows a 14-month review by the panel, which Mr. Bush ordered last year to assess the quality of overall intelligence about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
The Bush administration has been issuing increasingly sharp warnings about what it says are Iran's efforts to build nuclear weapons. The warnings have been met with firm denials in Tehran, which says its nuclear program is intended purely for civilian purposes.
The most complete recent statement by American agencies about Iran and its weapons, in an unclassified report sent to Congress in November by Porter J. Goss, director of central intelligence, said Iran continued "to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons."
The International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been conducting inspections in Iran for two years, has said it has not found evidence of any weapons program. But the agency has also expressed skepticism about Iran's insistence that its nuclear activities are strictly civilian.
The nine-member bipartisan presidential panel, led by Laurence Silberman, a retired federal judge, and Charles S. Robb, a former governor and senator from Virginia, had unrestricted access to the most senior people and the most sensitive documents of the intelligence agencies.
In its report, the panel is also expected to be sharply critical of American intelligence on North Korea. But in interviews, people who have been briefed on the commission's deliberations and conclusions said they regarded the record on Iran as particularly worrisome.
One person who described the panel's deliberations and conclusions characterized American intelligence on Iran as "scandalous," given the importance and relative openness of the country, compared with such an extreme case as North Korea.
That person and others who have been briefed on the panel's work would not be more specific in describing the inadequacies. But former government officials who are experts on Iran say that while American intelligence agencies have devoted enormous resources to Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979, they have had little success in the kinds of human spying necessary to understand Iranian decision-making.
Among the major setbacks, former intelligence officials have said, was the successful penetration in the late 1980's by Iranian authorities of the principal American spy network inside the country, which was being run from a C.I.A. station in Frankfurt. The arrests of reported American spies was known at the time, but the impact on American intelligence reverberated as late as the mid-1990's.
A spokesman for the commission, Carl Kropf, declined to comment about any conclusions reached.
The last National Intelligence Estimate on Iran was completed in 2001 and is now being reassessed, according to American intelligence officials. As a first step, the National Intelligence Council, which produces the estimates and reports to Mr. Goss, is expected this spring to circulate a classified update that will focus on Iran and its weapons.
In Congress, the Senate Intelligence Committee has recently begun its own review into the quality of intelligence on Iran, in what the Republican and Democratic leaders of the panel have described as an effort to pre-empt any repeat of the experience in Iraq, where prewar American assertions about illicit weapons proved to be mistaken. But Congressional officials say the language of some recent intelligence reports on Iran has included more caveats and qualifications than in the past, in what they described as the agencies' own response to the Iraq experience.
In testimony last month, intelligence officials from several agencies told Congress that they were convinced that Tehran wanted nuclear weapons, but also said the uncertainty played to Iran's advantage.
"The Iranians don't necessarily have to have a successful nuclear program in order to have the deterrent value," said Carol A. Rodley, the State Department's second-ranking top intelligence official. "They merely have to convince us, others and their neighbors that they do."
The commission's findings will also include recommendations for further structural changes among intelligence agencies, to build on the legislation Mr. Bush signed in December that sets up a new director of national intelligence. Among the proposals discussed but apparently rejected was the idea of consolidating the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency into a single Defense Department operation that would integrate what are now divided responsibilities for satellite reconnaissance and eavesdropping operations.
The panel is to send a classified report to Mr. Bush by March 31. The panel is expected to issue an unclassified version at about the same time, but it is not clear whether the criticism of intelligence on Iran will be included in that public document, the people familiar with the panel's deliberations said.
In a television interview in February on Fox News, Vice President Dick Cheney described the work of the commission as "one of the most important things that's going forward today."
In the case of Iraq, a National Intelligence Estimate completed in October 2002 was among the assessments that expressed certainty that Baghdad possessed chemical and biological weapons and was rebuilding its nuclear program. Those assessments were wrong, and a report last year by the chief American weapons inspector found that Iraq had destroyed what remained of its illicit arsenal nearly a decade before the United States invasion.
A report last summer by the Senate committee concluded that the certainty of prewar assessments on Iraq had not been supported by the intelligence available at the time. At the Central Intelligence Agency, senior officials have defended the assessments, but they have also imposed new guidelines intended to reduce the prospect for failures.
Among those guidelines, an intelligence official said Tuesday, is a requirement that in producing future National Intelligence Estimates, the National Intelligence Council state more explicitly how much confidence it places on each judgment it makes. Those guidelines are being enforced in the updates on the Iranian nuclear program and in the revised National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which will address issues like political stability as well. |
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新手上路
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Posted - 03/12/2005 : 11:47:37
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http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR3/2557235.shtml
伊朗獲離心機 製核武突破
編譯楊清順／法新社伊斯蘭馬巴德十一日電
巴基斯坦新聞部長拉希德十日爆料說，現已失勢的巴基斯坦核武之父卡恩提供製造核武的重要設備離心機給伊朗，但巴基斯坦政府絕對沒有涉入其間。
拉希德說：「卡恩提供離心機給伊朗，但這件事和巴基斯坦政府無關。他是透過黑市供貨，巴基斯坦政府並未涉入。」
巴國此時首次公開承認卡恩提供提煉鈾所需要的離心機給伊朗，正值美國加強對伊朗施壓，促其放棄追求核武的野心。
美國認為，伊朗取得離心機，就有能力提煉武器級鈾。官員說，美國國務卿康朵莉莎•賴斯下周訪問巴國，伊朗發展核武料將是主要議題。
卡恩在巴國政府開始調查核子擴散問題後，於二○○四年二月坦承洩漏核武機密給伊朗、北韓及敘利亞。巴國政府是因接獲聯合國國際原子能總署通知，在二○○三年十一月展開調查。
卡恩後來獲得巴國總統穆沙拉夫特赦，目前形同被軟禁在伊斯蘭馬巴德。國際原子能總署去年九月曾要求直接和卡恩談，但遭巴國拒絕。拉希德十日重申，巴國不會將卡恩交給任何國家。
美國曾說，卡恩是個擴散核武技術到許多國家的國際黑市網絡的頭目。巴國外交部官員說，巴國當局在偵訊卡恩時，意外得知他提供過時的離心機給伊朗。
美國和歐洲十一日就如何處理伊朗核問題取得共識，雙方各讓一步，美國同意提供經濟誘因，歐盟則同意伊朗如果再不妥協，即將此案交由安理會處理，可能導致經濟制裁等結果。
【2005/03/12 聯合報】 |
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新手上路
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Posted - 03/12/2005 : 11:49:50
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http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110504+112005031200066,00.html
2005.03.12 中國時報
解決伊朗核武 美歐雙頭並進達協議
尹德瀚/綜合華盛頓十一日外電報導
美國和歐洲聯盟已經就如何解決伊朗提煉濃縮鈾而涉嫌在研發核子武器的問題達成協議，雙方決定採取分頭並進的策略，據此，美國同意對伊朗提供少許經濟誘因而交換其終止提煉濃縮鈾的計畫，歐盟則同意，如果談判手段不能奏效，他們將把這個問題訴諸聯合國安全理事會。
《華盛頓郵報》報導，這項協議係由美國副國務卿佐立克與英、法、德這三個歐盟成員國官員達成；而美國提供的誘因包括支持伊朗加入「世界貿易組織」、銷售重要的民航飛機零組件給伊朗。
《紐約時報》說，這項協議代表布希政府和歐洲對伊朗策略的重大轉折；布希政府幾年來一直拒絕對伊朗提供誘因，而歐洲也不肯以制裁為手段對伊朗施壓。但美國堅持，除非伊朗同意永遠停止提煉濃縮鈾的計畫，美國提供的誘因才會落實。
美國官員說，對伊朗的談判仍將由歐盟進行，美國不會加入。英、法、德三國從去年十二月起即與伊朗談判，試圖說服伊朗放棄其核子計畫，包括提煉濃縮鈾。這項談判已經進行了四個回合，第五回合預定本月下旬展開。
伊朗在這段談判期間已暫時凍結提煉濃縮鈾的活動，但德黑蘭當局一再堅稱，他們發展核子計畫是為了滿足能源需求，所以他們不會放棄。
布希政府中有些官員表示，他們相信不論美國提供什麼誘因，伊朗都不會放棄提煉濃縮鈾計畫，因此美方才同意提供少許誘因，以加速歐洲和伊朗的談判，讓伊朗的真正意圖現形，如此一來，歐洲就必須把這個問題送交聯合國安理會處理。
美國一直希望由國際原子能總署把伊朗的涉嫌研發核武的問題訴諸安理會，但沒有歐盟的合作，美國在原子能總署理事會絕對得不到足夠的支持票數。美官員說，如今已獲得英法德的承諾，如果在美提供誘因的情況下，伊朗還不肯放棄核子計畫，雙方就透過原能總署提交安理會處置。 |
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200 Posts |
Posted - 03/15/2005 : 16:57:05
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http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/15/politics/15treaty.html?th
Reshaping Nuclear Pact: Bush Seeks to Close Loopholes
By DAVID E. SANGER
Published: March 15, 2005
WASHINGTON, March 14 - Behind President Bush's recent shift in dealing with Iran's nuclear program lies a less visible goal: to rewrite, in effect, the main treaty governing the spread of nuclear technology, without actually renegotiating it.
In their public statements and background briefings in recent days, Mr. Bush's aides have acknowledged that Iran appears to have the right - on paper, at least - to enrich uranium to produce electric power. But Mr. Bush has managed to convince his reluctant European allies that the only acceptable outcome of their negotiations with Iran is that it must give up that right.
In what amounts to a reinterpretation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Mr. Bush now argues that there is a new class of nations that simply cannot be trusted with the technology to produce nuclear material even if the treaty itself makes no such distinction.
So far the administration has not declared publicly that its larger goal beyond Iran is to remake a treaty whose intellectual roots date back to the Eisenhower administration, under the cold war banner of "Atoms for Peace." To state publicly that Iran is really a test case of Mr. Bush's broader effort, one senior administration official said, "would complicate what's already a pretty messy negotiation."
But just three days before the White House announced its new approach to Iran - in which it allowed Europe to offer broader incentives in return for an agreement to ask the United Nations for sanctions if Iran refuses to give up the ability to make nuclear material - Mr. Bush issued a statement that left little doubt about where he was headed.
The statement was advertised by the White House as a routine commemoration of the treaty's 35th anniversary, and a prelude to a meeting in May in New York to consider its future. It never mentioned Iran by name. But after lauding the past accomplishments of the treaty, also known as the N.P.T., in limiting the spread of nuclear arms, Mr. Bush went on to say, "We cannot allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international community to undermine the N.P.T.'s fundamental role in strengthening international security.
"We must therefore close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs."
On Sunday, his new national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, took the next step, making clear the connection to the current crisis with Iran. Yes, he said on CNN, the Iranians say their nuclear work is entirely for peaceful purposes. He cited no new evidence of a secret Iranian project to build a bomb, though that is what the Central Intelligence Agency and officials like Mr. Hadley insist is happening. (Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency say they join in the suspicion, but have no compelling evidence.)
But Mr. Hadley emphasized that Iran's leaders "keep their secrets very well." They hid much of their enrichment activity from international inspectors for 18 years, then insisted that it was not really for weapons, he said. He said that "raises serious suspicions" about Iran's true intent. Now, he said, the Europeans have come around to the view that "the best guarantee is for them to permanently abandon their enrichment facilities."
Mr. Bush could have called for renegotiating the treaty. But in background interviews, administration officials say they have neither the time nor the patience for that process. By the time all 189 signers come to an agreement, noted one official who left the White House recently: "The Iranians will look like the North Koreans, waving their bombs around. We can't afford to make that mistake again." (North Korea has declared it is no longer a party to the treaty, though it signed it. Israel, India and Pakistan never signed it.)
After a visit to Tehran last week for a conference that Iran sponsored to explain its nuclear ambitions, George Perkovich, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, said he had concluded that Mr. Bush had the right instinct, but might not be taking the right approach.
"The Iranians have decided to go on the offensive and simply assert their right, even if the treaty doesn't explicitly say that they have a right to enrich their own uranium," he said Monday. The view expressed by Iran's nuclear negotiators, he said, amounted to "We're not hiding it, we're not embarrassed by it, and no one is going to take our right away."
Iran's leaders are still testing the Europeans, believing that in the end, Europe will decide to take the risk of letting Iran manufacture its own nuclear fuel rather than engage in a confrontation, Mr. Perkovich said.
At the heart of Mr. Bush's concern is a fundamental flaw in the treaty. As long as nations allow inspections and declare their facilities and nuclear work, they get the atomic agency's seal of approval and, often, technical aid. But there is nothing to prevent a country, once it has learned how to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel rods, from withdrawing from the treaty and moving full-bore toward a bomb. North Korea did exactly that two years ago, and now says it reprocessed a huge cache of spent nuclear fuel to make it suitable for weapons. While American intelligence estimates vary, the consensus appears to be that that is enough to produce six or eight nuclear weapons.
While Mr. Bush and the director general of the I.A.E.A., Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, have different proposals to deal with the problem, they agree that established nuclear nations should supply fuel to countries that need it. While this would help ensure that no nation could secretly produce bomb-grade fuel, smaller countries say they should not be dependent on the West or international consortiums for a crucial source of energy.
A little more than a year ago, after the arrest of A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear engineer who helped arm Iran, North Korea and Libya, Mr. Bush announced a proposal: in the future, the world will not allow countries to manufacture nuclear fuel. He exempted any nation already producing it - meaning the United States, many European nations and Japan, among others. So far, he has done little to turn that proposal into legal language, and so far he has garnered almost no support.
But the nuclear clock is ticking, and some of Mr. Bush's aides fear that Iran is heading the same way as North Korea did in the 1990's - playing out the negotiations while its scientists and engineers pick up skills, leaving open a withdrawal from the treaty. Alternatively, some in the C.I.A. believe that there are really two nuclear projects under way in Iran: a public one that inspectors visit, and a parallel, secret one on the country's military reservations.
The Iranians deny that, but admit they have built huge tunnels at some crucial sites and buried other facilities altogether. Mr. Perkovich said that when Iranian officials were asked about that at the conference, they answered, "If you thought the Americans were going to bomb you, wouldn't you bury this stuff, too?" |
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Posted - 03/18/2005 : 16:41:33
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http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR3/2567753.shtml
伊朗總統：不會為任何誘因放棄核子計畫
中央社伊斯法罕十七日法新電
伊朗總統哈塔米斷言，沒有任何誘因足以說服該國放棄核子計畫；但他又保証，伊朗將「盡其所能」以使全世界相信該國不會製造核彈。
哈塔米在記者會中說：「我們不會放棄核子技術以換取任何誘因，我們不會接受任何誘因，同時我們將盡其所能，以使全世界相信，我們的核子計畫屬和平用途。」
他在被詢及美國要求伊朗放棄燃料再生和鈾濃縮作業一事時答稱：「那麼我也要求（美國總統）布希，停止對伊朗和中東採取錯誤的政策。」
哈塔米說：「中東有些危機的起因在於美國，如果美國真心希望防止核武出現，那麼就應該針對不遵守國際規範的非禁止核武擴散條約簽約國而發。」
他說：「其中最具危險性的國家是以色列。我們也擔心核武，我們絕不會設法建造核武，因為這與我們的信仰牴觸。」
伊朗現正與英國、法國和德國談判中，這些國家一直試圖獲取「真實的保證」，即伊朗神職政權不會利用其核能計畫來建造核武。
【2005/03/17 中央社】 |
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