quote:

---

作者 Mariano42 (Mariano Rivera) 看板 Gossiping
標題 [爆卦] 維基解密有關台灣部分
時間 Tue Nov 30 08:18:21 2010
───────────────────────────────────────

目前只找到這一項被歸類在"機密"
是由北京於09年4/30發給華府
請有空的強者翻譯

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BEIJING1176.html
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXXDISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the upcoming May World
Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on “
one China, very broadly interpreted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX working
lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he would ask for
appropriate meetings in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the
next G-20 summit. XXXXXXXXXXXX reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss
during his upcoming visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the
United States to re-engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were
suspended for an extended period, we should consider maintaining engagement
in other ways. On Iran, Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by
Washington and had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for
Iran to resume a positive role in the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan,
XXXXXXXXXXXX asked to see a list of items that would be transported via the
proposed Northern Distribution Network, given that “non-lethal” is a broad
and vague term.

¶2. (S) Summary Continued: XXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China’s “
core interests” of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could
“derail” bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao
Zhisheng human rights cases, to which XXXXXXXXXXXX replied with standard
language about Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the
exit from China of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound;
XXXXXXXXXXXX promised to assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea
to release the two detained American journalists; XXXXXXXXXXXX said China
would. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concern over building “momentum” on UNSC
reform and asked the United States not to be “proactive” on the matter. The
Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of
Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou
had begun to affect other parts of our support for each other’s practical
needs including residential leases and asked for XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assistance
in stopping this trend. The Charge and XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed on the importance
of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of
recent and upcoming visits. End Summary.

TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA
--------------------------

¶3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the
World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was “one step forward”
toward better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved
through consultations based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,”
XXXXXXXXXXXX said at a XXXXXXXXXXXX working lunch hosted by the Charge d’
Affaires. Cross-Strait relations were “improving,” and as they did, China
hoped the United States would feel “less burdened, frustrated and nervous,”
XXXXXXXXXXXX said. The Charge congratulated XXXXXXXXXXXX on the agreement,
noting its timeliness in light of concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while
expressing hope that both sides would continue to take steps to increase
mutual trust.

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS
-------------------------------

¶4. (C) The Charge and XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed on the importance of high-level
meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and
upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead’
s visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President
Obama told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations
between our two militaries forward. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that State Councilor
Liu Yandong’s visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been
productive. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Liu came away “very impressed” by her
interaction with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to “follow up” on
the issues they discussed such as education, something very basic and
important to the people of both countries.

¶5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by
Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department
BEIJING 00001176 002 OF 005
Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li
could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. XXXXXXXXXXXX
replied that the visit of Li, a “future leader of China,” was “very
important,” so China hoped the United States would provide a full schedule
of meetings with senior leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently
met with State Councilor Liu. The Charge urged XXXXXXXXXXXX to arrange a
useful schedule for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to
Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that the Speaker was also particularly
interested in climate change and environmental issues. China would treat
Speaker Pelosi’s visit as a type of “state visit,” XXXXXXXXXXXX replied.
Nevertheless, given her “tight schedule,” the Speaker would likely “not
have time” to visit Tibet, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.

¶6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this
year,XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China
relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than
other bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents
in mind, both sides should be “careful” and act in ways that benefit the
long-term interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would
meet several times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC
summits, after which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We
should plan our work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with
the President’s visit to China in mind.

G-20: DATES AND TOPICS
-----------------------

¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that, XXXXXXXXXXXX he would ask to meet with NSC
’s Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an
appropriate meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include
the dates of the next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda.

¶8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions
had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, XXXXXXXXXXXX
noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform
of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the
London Summit, XXXXXXXXXXXX felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had
been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington
could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the
Europeans.

¶9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX had succeeded
in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international
financial institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an
implementation period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to
discuss with Froman:
A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20
economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;
B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not “
break their promises as soon as they returned home”;
C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New
Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and
D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an
alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

¶10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that a stable
U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in “
destabilizing the system.” The system, however, was “not perfect and needs
reform.” He said China had a huge stake in how the United States managed the
dollar. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the RMB could become a component
of the SDR. Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR
value, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical
change.

¶11. (U) Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s comments on the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue will be reported septel.

VFM HE’S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK
---------------------------------------------

BEIJING 00001176 003 OF 005

¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his
upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and
Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX hoped to hold “informal
consultations” in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans,
not just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless
needed to discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to
preserve our common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North
Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore
acting like a “spoiled child” in order to get the attention of the “adult.
” China therefore encouraged the United States, “after some time,” to
start to re-engage the DPRK. In this regard, it was good that the New York
channel remained open, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed. Noting that Special
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth would visit Beijing in
May, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, if the Six-Party Talks would be on hold for an
extended period, then the Six Parties needed to find ways to continue to
engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or even perhaps
trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to reinforce
Pyongyang’s bad behavior.

¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in
Washington. Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington. China
had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume
playing a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made
moderate Arab countries “jittery,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said, this should be a
matter the United States could “manage.” What was essential was to get Iran
involved positively in the region again.

¶14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan.
The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new
money for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors’ Conference, China
still had an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply
route via China for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route
question, XXXXXXXXXXXX said China would like to see a list of items that
would be transported on the proposed route, noting that “non-lethal” is awould be transported on the proposed route, noting that “non-lethal” is a
broad and vague term.

TIBET AND TAIWAN AS “CORE INTERESTS”
------------------------------------

¶15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of
Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. On
Tibet, China had heard “rumors” that the Dalai Lama would attend a “seminar
” in the United States in late September or early October, and that
President Obama was “likely” to meet with him then. Noting that there was
no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet,
XXXXXXXXXXXX said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to
“take care” of each other’s “core interests.” When considering such
sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be
viewed either as “obstacles” or as “core interests.” It did not matter
whether one side “liked or disliked” such matters; rather, in a “mature,
close and important” bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was
whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United
States had its core interests, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted, such as U.S. naval
vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to “step
down” over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese
public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would denyhim a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him,
including no meeting with President Obama.

¶16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “
core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.”
Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an
attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet
is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious
leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity.
Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out.
Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the
Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China.
China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and
engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a
visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated.

BEIJING 00001176 004 OF 005

¶17. (C) Another issue that could “derail” relations was arms sales to
Taiwan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,
especially advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible
“very important” and “potent” arms sales to Taiwan, including 60
Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a “
very serious issue” for China, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. The Charge replied that
there had been no change to our one China policy based on the three joint
communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA,
the United States made available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed
Taiwan to maintain a credible defense. The Charge urged China to take steps
to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan.

HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG
---------------------------------------

¶18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the
status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory
Liu Xiaobo and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that, as a
sign of the “maturity” of our bilateral relationship, he had “repeatedly”
listened to our concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be
handled “according to law” and in accordance with China’s legal/judicial
system. Such cases were “sensitive” and should be handled “carefully,”
XXXXXXXXXXXX said, pledging that he nevertheless would look into the cases “
to the extent possible.”

NORTH KOREAN “GUESTS”
---------------------

¶19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures
from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and
asked for XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assistance in doing so. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he would
look into the matter.

U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK
---------------------------------

¶20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two
American journalists detained in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that the
United States could “rest assured” that China would do so.

UNSC REFORM
-----------

¶21. (C) China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN
Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform
and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in
a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not
a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not
be “diluted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China
and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be
difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the
UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy
review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific
proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be
allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5
influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been
made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC,
it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include
Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget.

COCA II: AVOIDING A “TRADE WAR”
--------------------------------

¶22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a
Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General
in Guangzhou had begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked
XXXXXXXXXXXX to speak with the appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend
before significant damage was done. The COCA II team from Washington held
good discussions in Beijing last week with MFA DG for Administrative Affairs
Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou complex. The U.S. Embassy today had
formally invited DG Li to Washington in May for further talks. One serious
problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having moved to block new housing
leases for the U.S. Embassy in

BEIJING 00001176 005 OF 005

Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said this situation sounded like a “trade war.” The Charge
asked XXXXXXXXXXXX to help stop this matter before it led to a downward
cycle. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed real progress had been made and
differences narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that
China did not want a “trade war” over COCA II issues. He pledged to “look
into” the matter.
PICCUTA

推 floyyed:WHA那段那個被隱形的名字應該是楊志良或是外交部長

→ teryu:through consultations based on “one China, 11/30 08:57
→ teryu:, very broadly interpreted,” 11/30 08:57
→ teryu:通過協商的基礎上“一個中國，非常廣義的解釋，” 11/30 08:58
→ teryu:應該是... 一中各婊! 11/30 08:59

→ ahyang:xxxxxxxxxxxxx ->中國外交部副部長何亞飛

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Captain Sulu



我對這位仁兄很好奇，因為他根本是Cyberpunk美學風格活生生的樣版，和平獎絕對不是他感興趣的東西，某種程度上他會成為網路暗黑反社會的偶像人物，只是無可避免它可以被現今各國權力者用各種管道修理他，包括用媒體、以及他最擅長的駭客方法，他的各種電磁記錄被植入不利於他的記錄。記者！艾西莫夫的科幻小說裡那個手握銀行系大權陰謀家的第一個化身。

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Lugiahua

他之前還放話說要掀俄羅斯的機密
只能請他多小心雨傘...

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Lugiahua

他之前還放話說要掀俄羅斯的機密
只能請他多小心雨傘...

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by snoopy060507

quote:

---

Originally posted by Lugiahua

他之前還放話說要掀俄羅斯的機密
只能請他多小心雨傘...

---

一直都感到有有力人士甚至是國家在幫他…這樣狂妄居然還沒被河蟹掉…

只是幫他有好處可言嗎？幾乎是各國各業都被他得罪光了？

據說下一波是要爆銀行的料，很好很強大，看看會不會讓房價掉下來∼

拜託了∼加油，維基解密∼

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by Lugiahua

他之前還放話說要掀俄羅斯的機密
只能請他多小心雨傘...

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by eshozhao

[quote]Originally posted by Lugiahua
恐怕會被前蘇聯直傳的殺人術--傘頭戳死？

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by BlueWhaleMoon

最引人注目的，是一則美國線民在台灣總統府得到的消息。消息來源指出，馬英九政府為了避免過多的社會與國際關注，常常在總統辦公室內，用自己的電腦跟中國領導人胡錦濤聊 Skype 。
==
不知真假...不過這個很有意思.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by cchs

我看不懂讀賣新聞的日文 婦女暴行容疑で指名手配??
Julian Paul Assange對婦女幹了甚麼暴行 ICPO要通緝他??

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by LUMBER

quote:

---

Originally posted by Lugiahua

他之前還放話說要掀俄羅斯的機密
只能請他多小心雨傘...

---

他最好說到作到
不然又是一個欺善怕惡的傢伙....

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by huangmin95

quote:

---

Originally posted by cchs

我看不懂讀賣新聞的日文 婦女暴行容疑で指名手配??
Julian Paul Assange對婦女幹了甚麼暴行 ICPO要通緝他??

---

據說他在瑞士強暴了兩名婦女，可是這個是羅生門就是了
ICPO指是一個國際通緝發布而已，當地國對外國人發布的通緝，然後委託ICPO像全球合作單位發布，聽起來很聳動，實際上其實還好

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by dasha

quote:

---

Originally posted by LUMBER

quote:

---

Originally posted by Lugiahua

他之前還放話說要掀俄羅斯的機密
只能請他多小心雨傘...

---

他最好說到作到
不然又是一個欺善怕惡的傢伙....

---

已經被通緝了,要做到恐怕有點難......

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by yusaku

AMAZON解釋關閉維基解密服務的原因，表示絕對沒有受到政府的壓力
http://news.nicovideo.jp/watch/nw11411

中國人愛吃蟹，西方人也愛吃，河蟹好好吃哦！

---

quote:

---

最引人注目的，是一則美國線民在台灣總統府得到的消息。消息來源指出，馬英九政府為了避免過多的社會與國際關注，常常在總統辦公室內，用自己的電腦跟中國領導人胡錦濤聊 Skype 。
==

---