要先看兵推假設 1 兵推基本上接受PLA有能力監控西太平洋的海面 2 兵推中接受PLA超音速反艦彈的性能如宣傳 裡面給了一個例子，一艘神盾巡+2艘柏克，面對轟6群96發超音速彈 中彈3發，隨機分配剛好一艘一發，三艘都暫時失去戰鬥力 P32 In a simple demonstration, 24 Chinese H-6 bombers launch a total of 96 YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles
還記得採購紀德艦時 就有人評估扛不下轟六擊群一輪齊射？
兵推中，在PLA海空打擊範圍內，有另一個例子，2艘尼米茲+29艘神盾+10核潛 在接近台灣途中被PLA火力擊潰 P98 After three weeks of conflict, a U.S. fleet of 29 cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and 10 SSNs approached Taiwan. Under withering fire from Chinese submarines, air-launched ASCMs, and surface ships, the US fleet was largely destroyed without relieving Taiwan.
連這等規模都無法在PLA打擊範圍內存活，台灣海軍根本在兵推假定下耗無機會
報告沒說細節，不過大致結論是台灣海軍很快就覆滅 P2 The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities.
P88 Taiwan’s air losses included roughly half of its operational air force, the majority lost on the ground to missile strikes. Even within the scope of the these relatively short iterations, the 26 ships of Taiwan’s navy (22 frigates and 4 destroyers) were destroyed by a combination of China’s joint fire strikes and aggressive hunting by China’s second-tier naval ships.
P124 The Taiwanese surface navy would be quickly destroyed without inflicting significant damage on the Chinese fleet
P133 Until the Chinese ground-launched missile inventory was exhausted, it was too dangerous for U.S. or Japanese surface ships to approach Taiwan
美日艦隊不只被擊倒在港口 有在大洋的雙航母特遣艦隊被擊潰 P98 After three weeks of conflict, a U.S. fleet of 29 cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and 10 SSNs approached Taiwan. Under withering fire from Chinese submarines, air-launched ASCMs, and surface ships, the US fleet was largely destroyed without relieving Taiwan.
P133 Until the Chinese ground-launched missile inventory was exhausted, it was too dangerous for U.S. or Japanese surface ships to approach Taiwan
不過兵推抱怨匿蹤重轟遠程對艦彈存量太少，2026只有450枚LRASM，一周就打光庫存，根本不夠用 P88 Critical Variables: The LRASM was particularly useful because of its ability to strike Chinese naval forces and directly reduce Chinese invasion capabilities. In every iteration, the United States expended its entire global inventory of LRASMs (about 450 missiles) within the first week of the conflict.
要先看兵推假設 1 兵推基本上接受PLA有能力監控西太平洋的海面 2 兵推中接受PLA超音速反艦彈的性能如宣傳 裡面給了一個例子，一艘神盾巡+2艘柏克，面對轟6群96發超音速彈 中彈3發，隨機分配剛好一艘一發，三艘都暫時失去戰鬥力 P32 In a simple demonstration, 24 Chinese H-6 bombers launch a total of 96 YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles
兵推中，在PLA海空打擊範圍內，有另一個例子，2艘尼米茲+29艘神盾+10核潛 在接近台灣途中被PLA火力擊潰 P98 After three weeks of conflict, a U.S. fleet of 29 cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and 10 SSNs approached Taiwan. Under withering fire from Chinese submarines, air-launched ASCMs, and surface ships, the US fleet was largely destroyed without relieving Taiwan.
報告沒說細節，不過大致結論是台灣海軍很快就覆滅 P2 The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities.
P88 Taiwan’s air losses included roughly half of its operational air force, the majority lost on the ground to missile strikes. Even within the scope of the these relatively short iterations, the 26 ships of Taiwan’s navy (22 frigates and 4 destroyers) were destroyed by a combination of China’s joint fire strikes and aggressive hunting by China’s second-tier naval ships.
P133 Until the Chinese ground-launched missile inventory was exhausted, it was too dangerous for U.S. or Japanese surface ships to approach Taiwan
要先看兵推假設 1 兵推基本上接受PLA有能力監控西太平洋的海面 2 兵推中接受PLA超音速反艦彈的性能如宣傳 裡面給了一個例子，一艘神盾巡+2艘柏克，面對轟6群96發超音速彈 中彈3發，隨機分配剛好一艘一發，三艘都暫時失去戰鬥力 P32 In a simple demonstration, 24 Chinese H-6 bombers launch a total of 96 YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles
還記得採購紀德艦時 就有人評估扛不下轟六擊群一輪齊射？
兵推中，在PLA海空打擊範圍內，有另一個例子，2艘尼米茲+29艘神盾+10核潛 在接近台灣途中被PLA火力擊潰 P98 After three weeks of conflict, a U.S. fleet of 29 cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and 10 SSNs approached Taiwan. Under withering fire from Chinese submarines, air-launched ASCMs, and surface ships, the US fleet was largely destroyed without relieving Taiwan.
連這等規模都無法在PLA打擊範圍內存活，台灣海軍根本在兵推假定下耗無機會
報告沒說細節，不過大致結論是台灣海軍很快就覆滅 P2 The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities.
P88 Taiwan’s air losses included roughly half of its operational air force, the majority lost on the ground to missile strikes. Even within the scope of the these relatively short iterations, the 26 ships of Taiwan’s navy (22 frigates and 4 destroyers) were destroyed by a combination of China’s joint fire strikes and aggressive hunting by China’s second-tier naval ships.
P133 Until the Chinese ground-launched missile inventory was exhausted, it was too dangerous for U.S. or Japanese surface ships to approach Taiwan
"Until the Chinese ground-launched missile inventory was exhausted, it was too dangerous for U.S. or Japanese surface ships to approach Taiwan" "After three weeks of conflict, a U.S. fleet of 29 cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and 10 SSNs approached Taiwan. Under withering fire from..."
P139 帝國空軍重轟就是鎮國重器 The range and high ordnance throughput of bombers presented the Chinese with a particularly daunting challenge. The range of bombers meant that they could be based beyond the range of Chinese ballistic missiles, while their ordnance throughput meant that they could rapidly attrite Chinese forces.
P125 台灣應該投資豪豬策略建軍 Because Taiwan cannot match China ship-for-ship or aircraft-for-aircraft, the “porcupine strategy” proposes that Taiwan invest more heavily in “agile and concealable weapons such as the portable Javelin and Stinger missiles” rather than expensive and vulnerable conventional weapons.
P124 台灣要儘速強化武裝與儲備，開戰後會斷補一陣子 Once conflict begins, Taiwan’s isolation means that there can be no “Ukraine model.” . . . Therefore, all the equipment and munitions must arrive before China begins combat operations
P123 台灣海空軍需轉向不對趁方向調整 Move Taiwanese air and naval forces toward asymmetry. Such a structure made sense when Chinese air and naval forces were relatively weak. Taiwan’s ability to contest China in the air and at sea meant it could defeat an invasion before ground forces landed in strength. That minimized damage to Taiwanese infrastructure and its economy. Further, such a structure provided visible reminders of Taiwan’s power and status in peacetime and could counter peacetime Chinese efforts to test Taiwanese sovereignty.
P139 空軍重轟就是鎮國重器 The range and high ordnance throughput of bombers presented the Chinese with a particularly daunting challenge. The range of bombers meant that they could be based beyond the range of Chinese ballistic missiles, while their ordnance throughput meant that they could rapidly attrite Chinese forces.
P125 台灣應該投資豪豬策略建軍 Because Taiwan cannot match China ship-for-ship or aircraft-for-aircraft, the “porcupine strategy” proposes that Taiwan invest more heavily in “agile and concealable weapons such as the portable Javelin and Stinger missiles” rather than expensive and vulnerable conventional weapons.
P124 台灣要儘速強化武裝與儲備，開戰後會斷補一陣子 Once conflict begins, Taiwan’s isolation means that there can be no “Ukraine model.” . . . Therefore, all the equipment and munitions must arrive before China begins combat operations
P123 台灣海空軍需轉向不對趁方向調整 Move Taiwanese air and naval forces toward asymmetry. Such a structure made sense when Chinese air and naval forces were relatively weak. Taiwan’s ability to contest China in the air and at sea meant it could defeat an invasion before ground forces landed in strength. That minimized damage to Taiwanese infrastructure and its economy. Further, such a structure provided visible reminders of Taiwan’s power and status in peacetime and could counter peacetime Chinese efforts to test Taiwanese sovereignty.
中華民國海軍未來發展討論區29
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Posted - 01/13/2023 : 06:52:45
