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河蟹很好吃
剛剛入門
22 Posts |
 Posted - 12/05/2013 : 09:35:41
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五毛真可笑還在做g2的夢，g2夢中國夢，什麼妥協，美國金融資本把大陸當奴工廠玩弄，用一百年前的強國概念哄騙大陸人，你們是強國了，大陸人就真的信了，可惜現在是科學時代了，沒有任何核心科技的國家怎麼可能會是強國，美國人也真是很聰明，看穿大陸人和統治者的心思，你喜歡什麼我就吹捧你什麼，然後錢發達國家賺走了，污染廢水和濫發的人民幣以及巨大貧富懸殊下壓抑着的底層卻留在了大陸。
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Edited by - 河蟹很好吃 on 12/05/2013 09:41:17 |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 12/05/2013 : 12:42:06
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quote:
Originally posted by 河蟹很好吃
五毛真可笑還在做g2的夢，g2夢中國夢，什麼妥協，美國金融資本把大陸當奴工廠玩弄，用一百年前的強國概念哄騙大陸人，你們是強國了，大陸人就真的信了，可惜現在是科學時代了，沒有任何核心科技的國家怎麼可能會是強國，美國人也真是很聰明，看穿大陸人和統治者的心思，你喜歡什麼我就吹捧你什麼，然後錢發達國家賺走了，污染廢水和濫發的人民幣以及巨大貧富懸殊下壓抑着的底層卻留在了大陸。
沒有任何核心科技的國家是怎么当初研发两弹一星，现在是怎么探测器上月球的？有核心科技的国家怎么大量从没有核心科技的国家进口机械的？中国科技的实力在这里，这种嚎丧不过是败犬的叫唤而已。
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 12/05/2013 : 13:45:06
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quote:
Originally posted by Manfred
quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
又在转进了，之前谁在那咬牙切齿的说，不可能中国高速发展，世界停滞不前的？这个人可不是我。
中国现在的发展速度继续发展，只要不大减速，就依然是中国高速发展世界停滞不前的局面不变。
发达国家美日欧三大块，美国算是发展最快的，但是按照现在的发展速度，中美差距还在迅速缩小。
发展中国家中的大国无论俄国印度巴西没人能比中国现在发展更快。按照现在的发展速度，中国和其他发展中大国的差距还在拉大中。
至于中国未来会不会减速，什么时候会减速，你如果不怕步章家敦的覆辙，大可以预言啊。那年中国经济发展速度会降下来并从此一蹶不振？给个明白话让大家看看你的预测吧，可别象之前，人家问你中国世界工厂地位什么时候按你的预测失去，你给个一代人的说法，一代人是多久啊？20年还是30年？2033年还是2043年？等到那会中国早建立起足以称霸世界的国力了。
中国的发展速度从之前的双位数下降到现在的7.8%然后习胖子上台公开放弃以GDP增长为目标的发展模式，我当然有理由认为中国未来的发展速度会继续下降。
从双位数11/12降到现在的7.8，7.5这已经是增幅的很大下降，而且趋势十分的明显。日本在60-80年代的GDP增长也很快。你的无数前辈就预言80或者90年代超越美国。你不过是个重复着历史错误的小丑而已。
日本是在人均GDP赶上美国后才结束高速增长阶段的，预言日本90年代还继续高速增长的，那意味着日本人均GDP大大超过美国，要支撑这种财富水平，需要日本有大大高于美国的科技和生产水平才可以，日本当然没有，所以日本经济停滞了。
而中国现在人均GDP大大低于美国，因此中国追赶美国的空间远比那时候的日本大的多，如果中国和日本发展趋势一样，那意味着中国日后的经济规模达到美国的4倍后才停滞，要那样中国求之不得。
你和你无数中国崩溃论的前辈最大的错误就是，中国不是日本，中国的人口规模远远超过美国，版图和美国相当的洲际国家。
日本没有超越美国的潜力，正如威尼斯荷兰这种小国无论如何没有超越英国的潜力一样，而德国这种中型国家则可以赶上英国，美国俄国这种洲际国家则可以大大超过英国。
到底谁是重复着历史错误的小丑，我们过几年就可以知道，不过为了避免阁下耍赖，我还是要问一句，中国到底那一年如日本90年代一样开始经济停滞的？
既然阁下对中国注定经济规模无法超越美国那么自信，是个男人就给个明白的年份时间吧。
可别告诉我是和日本一样中国人均GDP赶上美国之后啊。 |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 12/05/2013 : 13:46:50
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quote:
Originally posted by 燃燒地板
有点恶心了。xk2013其实你不用浪费时间回每一个帖，给人机会发低水平的谩骂。心态平和一点，发自己的帖就好。林子大了什么鸟都有，何必较真呢？
你说的对，所以我找了两个他最离谱也算最切题的东西回复了他一下，我不会和这种人吵的，太无聊了。 |
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Manfred
路人甲乙丙
Canada
1957 Posts |
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Manfred
路人甲乙丙
Canada
1957 Posts |
Posted - 12/05/2013 : 19:56:36
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quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
日本是在人均GDP赶上美国后才结束高速增长阶段的，预言日本90年代还继续高速增长的，那意味着日本人均GDP大大超过美国，要支撑这种财富水平，需要日本有大大高于美国的科技和生产水平才可以，日本当然没有，所以日本经济停滞了。
而中国现在人均GDP大大低于美国，因此中国追赶美国的空间远比那时候的日本大的多，如果中国和日本发展趋势一样，那意味着中国日后的经济规模达到美国的4倍后才停滞，要那样中国求之不得。
你和你无数中国崩溃论的前辈最大的错误就是，中国不是日本，中国的人口规模远远超过美国，版图和美国相当的洲际国家。
日本没有超越美国的潜力，正如威尼斯荷兰这种小国无论如何没有超越英国的潜力一样，而德国这种中型国家则可以赶上英国，美国俄国这种洲际国家则可以大大超过英国。
到底谁是重复着历史错误的小丑，我们过几年就可以知道，不过为了避免阁下耍赖，我还是要问一句，中国到底那一年如日本90年代一样开始经济停滞的？
既然阁下对中国注定经济规模无法超越美国那么自信，是个男人就给个明白的年份时间吧。
可别告诉我是和日本一样中国人均GDP赶上美国之后啊。
恩，人均GDP低反而成了有追赶的空间。那很好，中国南面的邻居人均GDP更低，人口在可以预见的将来将超过中国，然后印度就会超越中国成为地球GDP之王咯？扯半天原来你是阿三的粉丝？
我从来没有说过中国的经济规模无法超越美国。我到记得有个X跟我打赌5年，现在已经不敢提了，扯什么10年之类的。按照目前的人口发展趋势，未来美国人口超越中国也是看的到的。所以等你人均赶上那会，别人没准就人口比你多了。
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 12/06/2013 : 05:14:44
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quote:
Originally posted by Manfred
quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
日本是在人均GDP赶上美国后才结束高速增长阶段的，预言日本90年代还继续高速增长的，那意味着日本人均GDP大大超过美国，要支撑这种财富水平，需要日本有大大高于美国的科技和生产水平才可以，日本当然没有，所以日本经济停滞了。
而中国现在人均GDP大大低于美国，因此中国追赶美国的空间远比那时候的日本大的多，如果中国和日本发展趋势一样，那意味着中国日后的经济规模达到美国的4倍后才停滞，要那样中国求之不得。
你和你无数中国崩溃论的前辈最大的错误就是，中国不是日本，中国的人口规模远远超过美国，版图和美国相当的洲际国家。
日本没有超越美国的潜力，正如威尼斯荷兰这种小国无论如何没有超越英国的潜力一样，而德国这种中型国家则可以赶上英国，美国俄国这种洲际国家则可以大大超过英国。
到底谁是重复着历史错误的小丑，我们过几年就可以知道，不过为了避免阁下耍赖，我还是要问一句，中国到底那一年如日本90年代一样开始经济停滞的？
既然阁下对中国注定经济规模无法超越美国那么自信，是个男人就给个明白的年份时间吧。
可别告诉我是和日本一样中国人均GDP赶上美国之后啊。
恩，人均GDP低反而成了有追赶的空间。那很好，中国南面的邻居人均GDP更低，人口在可以预见的将来将超过中国，然后印度就会超越中国成为地球GDP之王咯？扯半天原来你是阿三的粉丝？
我从来没有说过中国的经济规模无法超越美国。我到记得有个X跟我打赌5年，现在已经不敢提了，扯什么10年之类的。按照目前的人口发展趋势，未来美国人口超越中国也是看的到的。所以等你人均赶上那会，别人没准就人口比你多了。
人均GDP低意味着有成长空间，不过你先要把经济高速成长起来，不然再有潜力也是空的。
我们打赌说的是PPP计算的GDP，这里说的是汇率GDP，你在美国几年连中文都看不懂了？
你从来没有说过中国的经济规模无法超越美国？
“你的无数前辈就预言80或者90年代超越美国。你不过是个重复着历史错误的小丑而已。”
这话是你刚刚说的，马上就说自己从来没说过，谁是恬不知耻的小丑大家都明白了。麻烦阁下明白回答我，到底中国能不能超越美国啊，如果能，那我显然不是什么重复历史错误。如果不能，那到底中国那一年开始重蹈日本覆辙啊？
你要是真的相信你自己的理论而不是自己都不相信的死撑就明白的预言下，到底那一年中国会重蹈日本泡沫经济破灭增长停滞的情况，从而失去超越美国的机会？是个男人不是啊？结果你除了转进还是转进，小丑？说的不就是你这种说完话就自己抽自己，自己说的话连自己都不相信的人吗。
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Manfred
路人甲乙丙
Canada
1957 Posts |
Posted - 12/06/2013 : 11:24:44
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quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
人均GDP低意味着有成长空间，不过你先要把经济高速成长起来，不然再有潜力也是空的。
我们打赌说的是PPP计算的GDP，这里说的是汇率GDP，你在美国几年连中文都看不懂了？
你从来没有说过中国的经济规模无法超越美国？
“你的无数前辈就预言80或者90年代超越美国。你不过是个重复着历史错误的小丑而已。”
这话是你刚刚说的，马上就说自己从来没说过，谁是恬不知耻的小丑大家都明白了。麻烦阁下明白回答我，到底中国能不能超越美国啊，如果能，那我显然不是什么重复历史错误。如果不能，那到底中国那一年开始重蹈日本覆辙啊？
你要是真的相信你自己的理论而不是自己都不相信的死撑就明白的预言下，到底那一年中国会重蹈日本泡沫经济破灭增长停滞的情况，从而失去超越美国的机会？是个男人不是啊？结果你除了转进还是转进，小丑？说的不就是你这种说完话就自己抽自己，自己说的话连自己都不相信的人吗。
印度13-14年的预期增长5-5.5。一点都不低。而且近10年以来几乎都在这个数字以上。
就说PPP，几年啊？你这里前面说过汇率了？
我否定的是在几年里超越美国而不是无法超越美国啊。说日本经济超越美国也就是80年代中期。你成天在北京怎么中文那么烂被我随便玩啊？我干吗要预言？不是有赌局吗？你不会已经对自己没信心了吧？
还什么是不是男人？至少老子开凌志，你座地铁。老子有房有车有老婆有小孩。你有个P。 |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 03/14/2014 : 21:00:04
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Say Goodbye to Taiwan
对台湾说再见
他的那本大国政治的悲剧翻过很多次，总的看，我对他的逻辑的理解是没问题的，在台湾问题上，他的观点和我之前的判断基本是如出一辙。
http://www.ltaaa.com/bbs/thread-269627-1-1.html
WHAT ARE the implications for Taiwan of China’s continued rise? Not today. Not next year. No, the real dilemma Taiwan will confront looms in the decades ahead, when China, whose continued economic growth seems likely although not a sure thing, is far more powerful than it is today.
Contemporary China does not possess significant military power; its military forces are inferior, and not by a small margin, to those of the United States. Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the American military nowadays. China, in other words, is constrained by the present global balance of power, which is clearly stacked in America’s favor.
But power is rarely static. The real question that is often overlooked is what happens in a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against Taiwan and the United States, in which China controls much more relative power than it does today, and in which China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence: a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today. That world may seem forbidding, even ominous, but it is one that may be coming.
It is my firm conviction that the continuing rise of China will have huge consequences for Taiwan, almost all of which will be bad. Not only will China be much more powerful than it is today, but it will also remain deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. Moreover, China will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere, which means it will seek to reduce, if not eliminate, the American military presence in Asia. The United States, of course, will resist mightily, and go to great lengths to contain China’s growing power. The ensuing security competition will not be good for Taiwan, no matter how it turns out in the end. Time is not on Taiwan’s side. Herewith, a guide to what is likely to ensue between the United States, China and Taiwan.
IN AN ideal world, most Taiwanese would like their country to gain de jure independence and become a legitimate sovereign state in the international system. This outcome is especially attractive because a strong Taiwanese identity—separate from a Chinese identity—has blossomed in Taiwan over the past sixty-five years. Many of those people who identify themselves as Taiwanese would like their own nation-state, and they have little interest in being a province of mainland China.
According to National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, in 1992, 17.6 percent of the people living in Taiwan identified as Taiwanese only. By June 2013, that number was 57.5 percent, a clear majority. Only 3.6 percent of those surveyed identified as Chinese only. Furthermore, the 2011 Taiwan National Security Survey found that if one assumes China would not attack Taiwan if it declared its independence, 80.2 percent of Taiwanese would in fact opt for independence. Another recent poll found that about 80 percent of Taiwanese view Taiwan and China as different countries.
However, Taiwan is not going to gain formal independence in the foreseeable future, mainly because China would not tolerate that outcome. In fact, China has made it clear that it would go to war against Taiwan if the island declares its independence. The antisecession law, which China passed in 2005, says explicitly that “the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures” if Taiwan moves toward de jure independence. It is also worth noting that the United States does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, and according to President Obama, Washington “fully supports a one-China policy.”
Thus, the best situation Taiwan can hope for in the foreseeable future is maintenance of the status quo, which means de facto independence. In fact, over 90 percent of the Taiwanese surveyed this past June by the Election Study Center favored maintaining the status quo indefinitely or until some later date.
The worst possible outcome is unification with China under terms dictated by Beijing. Of course, unification could happen in a variety of ways, some of which are better than others. Probably the least bad outcome would be one in which Taiwan ended up with considerable autonomy, much like Hong Kong enjoys today. Chinese leaders refer to this solution as “one country, two systems.” Still, it has little appeal to most Taiwanese. As Yuan-kang Wang reports: “An overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s public opposes unification, even under favorable circumstances. If anything, longitudinal data reveal a decline in public support of unification.”
In short, for Taiwan, de facto independence is much preferable to becoming part of China, regardless of what the final political arrangements look like. The critical question for Taiwan, however, is whether it can avoid unification and maintain de facto independence in the face of a rising China.
WHAT ABOUT China? How does it think about Taiwan? Two different logics, one revolving around nationalism and the other around security, shape its views concerning Taiwan. Both logics, however, lead to the same endgame: the unification of China and Taiwan.
The nationalism story is straightforward and uncontroversial. China is deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. For China’s elites, as well as its public, Taiwan can never become a sovereign state. It is sacred territory that has been part of China since ancient times, but was taken away by the hated Japanese in 1895—when China was weak and vulnerable. It must once again become an integral part of China. As Hu Jintao said in 2007 at the Seventeenth Party Congress: “The two sides of the Straits are bound to be reunified in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
The unification of China and Taiwan is one of the core elements of Chinese national identity. There is simply no compromising on this issue. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Chinese regime is bound up with making sure Taiwan does not become a sovereign state and that it eventually becomes an integral part of China.
Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold sooner rather than later and that hopefully it can be done peacefully. At the same time, they have made it clear that force is an option if they have no other recourse.
The security story is a different one, and it is inextricably bound up with the rise of China. Specifically, it revolves around a straightforward but profound question: How is China likely to behave in Asia over time, as it grows increasingly powerful? The answer to this question obviously has huge consequences for Taiwan.
The only way to predict how a rising China is likely to behave toward its neighbors as well as the United States is with a theory of great-power politics. The main reason for relying on theory is that we have no facts about the future, because it has not happened yet. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we have no choice but to rely on theories to determine what is likely to transpire in world politics.
My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.
But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—which means being the only great power in the system.
What exactly does it mean to be a hegemon in the modern world? It is almost impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony, because it is too hard to sustain power around the globe and project it onto the territory of distant great powers. The best outcome a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon, to dominate one’s own geographical area. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere since about 1900. Although the United States is clearly the most powerful state on the planet today, it is not a global hegemon.
States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: they seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several great powers, so that those states will compete with each other and be unable to focus their attention and resources on them. In sum, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world. The United States enjoys that exalted position today.
What does this theory say about how China is likely to behave as it rises in the years ahead? Put simply, China will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will try to become a regional hegemon. In particular, China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors, especially India, Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it.
It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States lets other states in the Americas know that it is the boss.
An increasingly powerful China is also likely to attempt to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s.
These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbors, just as the United States prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. What state in its right mind would want other powerful states located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what happened in the previous two centuries when Japan was powerful and China was weak.
Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept U.S. military forces operating in its backyard? American policy makers, after all, go ballistic when other great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forces are invariably seen as a potential threat to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China feel safe with U.S. forces deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would China’s security not be better served by pushing the American military out of Asia?
Why should we expect China to act any differently than the United States did? Are Chinese leaders more principled than American leaders? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to imitate the United States and try to become a regional hegemon.
WHAT ARE the implications of this security story for Taiwan? The answer is that there is a powerful strategic rationale for China—at the very least—to try to sever Taiwan’s close ties with the United States and neutralize Taiwan. However, the best possible outcome for China, which it will surely pursue with increasing vigor over time, would be to make Taiwan part of China.
Unification would work to China’s strategic advantage in two important ways. First, Beijing would absorb Taiwan’s economic and military resources, thus shifting the balance of power in Asia even further in China’s direction. Second, Taiwan is effectively a giant aircraft carrier sitting off China’s coast; acquiring that aircraft carrier would enhance China’s ability to project military power into the western Pacific Ocean.
In short, we see that nationalism as well as realist logic give China powerful incentives to put an end to Taiwan’s de facto independence and make it part of a unified China. This is clearly bad news for Taiwan, especially since the balance of power in Asia is shifting in China’s favor, and it will not be long before Taiwan cannot defend itself against China. Thus, the obvious question is whether the United States can provide security for Taiwan in the face of a rising China. In other words, can Taiwan depend on the United States for its security?
LET US now consider America’s goals in Asia and how they relate to Taiwan. Regional hegemons go to great lengths to stop other great powers from becoming hegemons in their region of the world. The best outcome for any great power is to be the sole regional hegemon in the system. It is apparent from the historical record that the United States operates according to this logic. It does not tolerate peer competitors.
During the twentieth century, there were four great powers that had the capability to make a run at regional hegemony: Imperial Germany from 1900 to 1918, Imperial Japan between 1931 and 1945, Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945 and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Not surprisingly, each tried to match what the United States had achieved in the Western Hemisphere.
How did the United States react? In each case, it played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemons.
The United States entered World War I in April 1917 when Imperial Germany looked like it might win the war and rule Europe. American troops played a critical role in tipping the balance against the Kaiserreich, which collapsed in November 1918. In the early 1940s, President Franklin Roosevelt went to great lengths to maneuver the United States into World War II to thwart Japan’s ambitions in Asia and Germany’s ambitions in Europe. The United States came into the war in December 1941, and helped destroy both Axis powers. Since 1945, American policy makers have gone to considerable lengths to put limits on German and Japanese military power. Finally, during the Cold War, the United States steadfastly worked to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Eurasia and then helped relegate it to the scrap heap of history in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Shortly after the Cold War ended, the George H. W. Bush administration’s controversial “Defense Planning Guidance” of 1992 was leaked to the press. It boldly stated that the United States was now the most powerful state in the world by far and it planned to remain in that exalted position. In other words, the United States would not tolerate a peer competitor.
That same message was repeated in the famous 2002 National Security Strategy issued by the George W. Bush administration. There was much criticism of that document, especially its claims about “preemptive” war. But hardly a word of protest was raised about the assertion that the United States should check rising powers and maintain its commanding position in the global balance of power.
The bottom line is that the United States—for sound strategic reasons—worked hard for more than a century to gain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Since achieving regional dominance, it has gone to great lengths to prevent other great powers from controlling either Asia or Europe.
Thus, there is little doubt as to how American policy makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to behave toward China much the way it acted toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
China’s neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan and Russia as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam are worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China’s rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and even China joined forces with the United States to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
How does Taiwan fit into this story? The United States has a rich history of close relations with Taiwan since the early days of the Cold War, when the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek retreated to the island from the Chinese mainland. However, Washington is not obliged by treaty to come to the defense of Taiwan if it is attacked by China or anyone else.
Regardless, the United States will have powerful incentives to make Taiwan an important player in its anti-China balancing coalition. First, as noted, Taiwan has significant economic and military resources and it is effectively a giant aircraft carrier that can be used to help control the waters close to China’s all-important eastern coast. The United States will surely want Taiwan’s assets on its side of the strategic balance, not on China’s side.
Second, America’s commitment to Taiwan is inextricably bound up with U.S. credibility in the region, which matters greatly to policy makers in Washington. Because the United States is located roughly six thousand miles from East Asia, it has to work hard to convince its Asian allies—especially Japan and South Korea—that it will back them up in the event they are threatened by China or North Korea. Importantly, it has to convince Seoul and Tokyo that they can rely on the American nuclear umbrella to protect them. This is the thorny problem of extended deterrence, which the United States and its allies wrestled with throughout the Cold War.
If the United States were to sever its military ties with Taiwan or fail to defend it in a crisis with China, that would surely send a strong signal to America’s other allies in the region that they cannot rely on the United States for protection. Policy makers in Washington will go to great lengths to avoid that outcome and instead maintain America’s reputation as a reliable partner. This means they will be inclined to back Taiwan no matter what.
While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today.
In addition, geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage.
One might argue that there is a simple way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will not have an effective conventional deterrent against China in the not-too-distant future: put America’s nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This approach will not solve the problem, however, because the United States is not going to escalate to the nuclear level if Taiwan is being overrun by China. The stakes are not high enough to risk a general thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or even South Korea. Thus, the smart strategy for America is to not even try to extend its nuclear deterrent over Taiwan.
There is a second reason the United States might eventually forsake Taiwan: it is an especially dangerous flashpoint, which could easily precipitate a Sino-American war that is not in America’s interest. U.S. policy makers understand that the fate of Taiwan is a matter of great concern to Chinese of all persuasions and that they will be extremely angry if it looks like the United States is preventing unification. But that is exactly what Washington will be doing if it forms a close military alliance with Taiwan, and that point will not be lost on the Chinese people.
It is important to note in this regard that Chinese nationalism, which is a potent force, emphasizes how great powers like the United States humiliated China in the past when it was weak and appropriated Chinese territory like Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine crises breaking out over Taiwan or scenarios in which a crisis escalates into a shooting war. After all, Chinese nationalism will surely be a force for trouble in those crises, and China will at some point have the military wherewithal to conquer Taiwan, which will make war even more likely.
There was no flashpoint between the superpowers during the Cold War that was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a Sino-American security competition. Some commentators liken Berlin in the Cold War to Taiwan, but Berlin was not sacred territory for the Soviet Union and it was actually of little strategic importance for either side. Taiwan is different. Given how dangerous it is for precipitating a war and given the fact that the United States will eventually reach the point where it cannot defend Taiwan, there is a reasonable chance that American policy makers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense to abandon Taiwan and allow China to coerce it into accepting unification.
All of this is to say that the United States is likely to be somewhat schizophrenic about Taiwan in the decades ahead. On one hand, it has powerful incentives to make it part of a balancing coalition aimed at containing China. On the other hand, there are good reasons to think that with the passage of time the benefits of maintaining close ties with Taiwan will be outweighed by the potential costs, which are likely to be huge. Of course, in the near term, the United States will protect Taiwan and treat it as a strategic asset. But how long that relationship lasts is an open question.
SO FAR, the discussion about Taiwan’s future has focused almost exclusively on how the United States is likely to act toward Taiwan. However, what happens to Taiwan in the face of China’s rise also depends greatly on what policies Taiwan’s leaders and its people choose to pursue over time. There is little doubt that Taiwan’s overriding goal in the years ahead will be to preserve its independence from China. That aim should not be too difficult to achieve for the next decade, mainly because Taiwan is almost certain to maintain close relations with the United States, which will have powerful incentives as well as the capability to protect Taiwan. But after that point Taiwan’s strategic situation is likely to deteriorate in significant ways, mainly because China will be rapidly approaching the point where it can conquer Taiwan even if the American military helps defend the island. And, as noted, it is not clear that the United States will be there for Taiwan over the long term.
In the face of this grim future, Taiwan has three options. First, it can develop its own nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, and there is no question that a Taiwanese nuclear arsenal would markedly reduce the likelihood of a Chinese attack against Taiwan.
Taiwan pursued this option in the 1970s, when it feared American abandonment in the wake of the Vietnam War. The United States, however, stopped Taiwan’s nuclear-weapons program in its tracks. And then Taiwan tried to develop a bomb secretly in the 1980s, but again the United States found out and forced Taipei to shut the program down. It is unfortunate for Taiwan that it failed to build a bomb, because its prospects for maintaining its independence would be much improved if it had its own nuclear arsenal.
No doubt Taiwan still has time to acquire a nuclear deterrent before the balance of power in Asia shifts decisively against it. But the problem with this suggestion is that both Beijing and Washington are sure to oppose Taiwan going nuclear. The United States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear weapons, not only because they would encourage Japan and South Korea to follow suit, but also because American policy makers abhor the idea of an ally being in a position to start a nuclear war that might ultimately involve the United States. To put it bluntly, no American wants to be in a situation where Taiwan can precipitate a conflict that might result in a massive nuclear attack on the United States.
China will adamantly oppose Taiwan obtaining a nuclear deterrent, in large part because Beijing surely understands that it would make it difficult—maybe even impossible—to conquer Taiwan. What’s more, China will recognize that Taiwanese nuclear weapons would facilitate nuclear proliferation in East Asia, which would not only limit China’s ability to throw its weight around in that region, but also would increase the likelihood that any conventional war that breaks out would escalate to the nuclear level. For these reasons, China is likely to make it manifestly clear that if Taiwan decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it will strike its nuclear facilities, and maybe even launch a war to conquer the island. In short, it appears that it is too late for Taiwan to pursue the nuclear option.
Taiwan’s second option is conventional deterrence. How could Taiwan make deterrence work without nuclear weapons in a world where China has clear-cut military superiority over the combined forces of Taiwan and the United States? The key to success is not to be able to defeat the Chinese military—that is impossible—but instead to make China pay a huge price to achieve victory. In other words, the aim is to make China fight a protracted and bloody war to conquer Taiwan. Yes, Beijing would prevail in the end, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory. This strategy would be even more effective if Taiwan could promise China that the resistance would continue even after its forces were defeated on the battlefield. The threat that Taiwan might turn into another Sinkiang or Tibet would foster deterrence for sure.
This option is akin to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s famous “risk strategy,” which Imperial Germany adopted in the decade before World War I. Tirpitz accepted the fact that Germany could not build a navy powerful enough to defeat the mighty Royal Navy in battle. He reasoned, however, that Berlin could build a navy that was strong enough to inflict so much damage on the Royal Navy that it would cause London to fear a fight with Germany and thus be deterred. Moreover, Tirpitz reasoned that this “risk fleet” might even give Germany diplomatic leverage it could use against Britain.
There are a number of problems with this form of conventional deterrence, which raise serious doubts about whether it can work for Taiwan over the long haul. For starters, the strategy depends on the United States fighting side by side with Taiwan. But it is difficult to imagine American policy makers purposely choosing to fight a war in which the U.S. military is not only going to lose, but is also going to pay a huge price in the process. It is not even clear that Taiwan would want to fight such a war, because it would be fought mainly on Taiwanese territory—not Chinese territory—and there would be death and destruction everywhere. And Taiwan would lose in the end anyway.
Furthermore, pursuing this option would mean that Taiwan would be constantly in an arms race with China, which would help fuel an intense and dangerous security competition between them. The sword of Damocles, in other words, would always be hanging over Taiwan.
Finally, although it is difficult to predict just how dominant China will become in the distant future, it is possible that it will eventually become so powerful that Taiwan will be unable to put up major resistance against a Chinese onslaught. This would certainly be true if America’s commitment to defend Taiwan weakens as China morphs into a superpower.
Taiwan’s third option is to pursue what I will call the “Hong Kong strategy.” In this case, Taiwan accepts the fact that it is doomed to lose its independence and become part of China. It then works hard to make sure that the transition is peaceful and that it gains as much autonomy as possible from Beijing. This option is unpalatable today and will remain so for at least the next decade. But it is likely to become more attractive in the distant future if China becomes so powerful that it can conquer Taiwan with relative ease.
So where does this leave Taiwan? The nuclear option is not feasible, as neither China nor the United States would accept a nuclear-armed Taiwan. Conventional deterrence in the form of a “risk strategy” is far from ideal, but it makes sense as long as China is not so dominant that it can subordinate Taiwan without difficulty. Of course, for that strategy to work, the United States must remain committed to the defense of Taiwan, which is not guaranteed over the long term.
Once China becomes a superpower, it probably makes the most sense for Taiwan to give up hope of maintaining its de facto independence and instead pursue the “Hong Kong strategy.” This is definitely not an attractive option, but as Thucydides argued long ago, in international politics “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
By now, it should be glaringly apparent that whether Taiwan is forced to give up its independence largely depends on how formidable China’s military becomes in the decades ahead. Taiwan will surely do everything it can to buy time and maintain the political status quo. But if China continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears destined to become part of China.
THERE IS one set of circumstances under which Taiwan can avoid this scenario. Specifically, all Taiwanese should hope there is a drastic slowdown in Chinese economic growth in the years ahead and that Beijing also has serious political problems on the home front that work to keep it focused inward. If that happens, China will not be in a position to pursue regional hegemony and the United States will be able to protect Taiwan from China, as it does now. In essence, the best way for Taiwan to maintain de facto independence is for China to be economically and militarily weak. Unfortunately for Taiwan, it has no way of influencing events so that this outcome actually becomes reality.
When China started its impressive growth in the 1980s, most Americans and Asians thought this was wonderful news, because all of the ensuing trade and other forms of economic intercourse would make everyone richer and happier. China, according to the reigning wisdom, would become a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and its neighbors would have little to worry about. Many Taiwanese shared this optimistic outlook, and some still do.
They are wrong. By trading with China and helping it grow into an economic powerhouse, Taiwan has helped create a burgeoning Goliath with revisionist goals that include ending Taiwan’s independence and making it an integral part of China. In sum, a powerful China isn’t just a problem for Taiwan. It is a nightmare.
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest. This article is adapted from a speech he gave in Taipei on December 7, 2013, to the Taiwanese Association of International Relations. An updated edition of his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics will be published in April by W. W. Norton
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BlueWhaleMoon
我是老鳥
13035 Posts |
Posted - 03/15/2014 : 01:24:01
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quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
quote:
Originally posted by BlueWhaleMoon
你認為是是在德國發力之前，但是很多英文的資料都說是英國考慮到德國的影響很大
時間表
1850年 英美簽訂克萊頓－布林沃條約》－條約中規定：『美國和英國均不得對前述通航運河為自己取得或維持任何排他性的控制，同意任何一方均不得在該運河的要衝地區或附近建立或維持任何要塞，也不得對中美洲的任何區域實施佔領和統治。條約承諾，當締約雙方發生戰爭時，任何一方也不能向對方封鎖運河，美、英兩國共同負責保護任何一方修建運河工程的財產不受侵犯，運河完工時，雙方將保護它，使其不受阻礙、劫奪或不公允的沒收，雙方共同保證運河的中立，以使該運河永久自由開放，所投入的資本穩固可靠。』
1889年 英國制定了「兩強標準」從此皇家海軍的艦隊實力，必須要比歐陸最強的兩個海軍相加的實力，更大上10％
1890年 俾斯麥下台
1897年 俾斯麥過世。鐵必制就任海軍大臣，大海艦隊瞄準英國海軍建設開始。
1898年 美西戰爭
1900年 1898年12月到1900年2月5日，英、美兩國歷經曠日持久的談判，終於簽署了《美國和英國關於促進建造通航運河的條約》.以取代原來的《克萊頓－布林沃條約》。這個新的條約確立了美國對於巴拿馬運河開鑿前後所有權利的獨享特權，而英國只保有運河通航的自由權，看準了英國人已無力對抗美國，12月20日，美國又拋出3個修正案，進一步強化了對運河的控制，英國亦無條件接受。英國退出加勒比海。
刚看到。1897年 俾斯麥過世。鐵必制就任海軍大臣，大海艦隊瞄準英國海軍建設開始。这是那个位面的历史？英德关系恶化公认的标志是英德结盟尝试失败，德国第二次海军法案通过以及英法协约签署之后的事情了好吧。而在这之前从美加边境问题解决，到委内瑞拉危机到美西戰爭到英國退出加勒比海，美英大妥协早就完成了。当然不完成也不行，因为英国知道自己无力在美国进攻中防守加拿大，因为只要美国肯付出代价，就能让美国舰队赶上然后超过英国。实力才是根本。
原來在你的位面 俾斯麥不是在1897年過世 鐵必制不是在1897年就任海軍大臣
這可以解釋很多 |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 03/15/2014 : 02:29:12
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quote:
Originally posted by BlueWhaleMoon
quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
quote:
Originally posted by BlueWhaleMoon
你認為是是在德國發力之前，但是很多英文的資料都說是英國考慮到德國的影響很大
時間表
1850年 英美簽訂克萊頓－布林沃條約》－條約中規定：『美國和英國均不得對前述通航運河為自己取得或維持任何排他性的控制，同意任何一方均不得在該運河的要衝地區或附近建立或維持任何要塞，也不得對中美洲的任何區域實施佔領和統治。條約承諾，當締約雙方發生戰爭時，任何一方也不能向對方封鎖運河，美、英兩國共同負責保護任何一方修建運河工程的財產不受侵犯，運河完工時，雙方將保護它，使其不受阻礙、劫奪或不公允的沒收，雙方共同保證運河的中立，以使該運河永久自由開放，所投入的資本穩固可靠。』
1889年 英國制定了「兩強標準」從此皇家海軍的艦隊實力，必須要比歐陸最強的兩個海軍相加的實力，更大上10％
1890年 俾斯麥下台
1897年 俾斯麥過世。鐵必制就任海軍大臣，大海艦隊瞄準英國海軍建設開始。
1898年 美西戰爭
1900年 1898年12月到1900年2月5日，英、美兩國歷經曠日持久的談判，終於簽署了《美國和英國關於促進建造通航運河的條約》.以取代原來的《克萊頓－布林沃條約》。這個新的條約確立了美國對於巴拿馬運河開鑿前後所有權利的獨享特權，而英國只保有運河通航的自由權，看準了英國人已無力對抗美國，12月20日，美國又拋出3個修正案，進一步強化了對運河的控制，英國亦無條件接受。英國退出加勒比海。
刚看到。1897年 俾斯麥過世。鐵必制就任海軍大臣，大海艦隊瞄準英國海軍建設開始。这是那个位面的历史？英德关系恶化公认的标志是英德结盟尝试失败，德国第二次海军法案通过以及英法协约签署之后的事情了好吧。而在这之前从美加边境问题解决，到委内瑞拉危机到美西戰爭到英國退出加勒比海，美英大妥协早就完成了。当然不完成也不行，因为英国知道自己无力在美国进攻中防守加拿大，因为只要美国肯付出代价，就能让美国舰队赶上然后超过英国。实力才是根本。
原來在你的位面 俾斯麥不是在1897年過世 鐵必制不是在1897年就任海軍大臣
這可以解釋很多
认为俾斯麦下台鐵必制就任海軍大臣，大海艦隊瞄準英國海軍建設開始的请稍微了解下当时德国海军什么状况和世界排名，以及德国海军扩充发展史再说。一个最简单问题，如果那时候德国就剑指英国，张伯伦吃饱撑的去找德国谈结盟问题。 |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
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dasha
版主
41804 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 10:34:42
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xk2013兄推薦的書還沒看,不過藉這標題講一下另外的新聞事件,不離題也與xk2013兄講的那本書有關.
週二看好幾本日本的財經雜誌時,忘了是Diamond還是日經還是哪本,裡面用新聞的方式講到台灣的太陽花,然後說,太陽花前半年發生一件事情,蕭萬長帶郭台銘等去美國,要談有沒有機會加入TPP,因為21世紀內,南韓已經談了至少43個相關合作國,一堆大國,台灣只有7個,其中5個還是老早就有合作關係的中南美小國,剩下兩個也不大,所以希望藉由TPP突破,一次增加十幾個,而且是包括美國這種大國.然後美國給的建議:你們去找大陸談一談,大家一起以某種形式進來.當然,給學生一搞,破局了,現在台灣可真是北朝鮮化--如果以後學者不會創"台灣化"這個詞,當作比北朝鮮化更誇張的狀況的話......
雖然日本台灣講到中美關係,通常就當成是類似美蘇冷戰那種競爭關係,但這其實是美中兩國夾縫間國家的一種期望,不包含美國的所有態度.美國對中國的看法,大概從1940年開始,就覺得可以聯中制日蘇,當然也要聯日制中;中國一面倒向蘇聯時,美國也就只好全力扶植日本,等到中美關係正常化,美國就開始強迫日圓升值,替美國支撐全球經濟,結束與台灣的關係,以中制蘇,降低島鏈國家的重要性.
冷戰後的狀況,就更複雜,有的認為中美勢將對立,要重新扶植島鏈國家;但有的卻認為可以把高汙染高勞動的生產丟給中國,由美國享受金融成果,島鏈國家成為可有可無的牽制.相對的,東南亞或日韓台的立場比較簡單,美國過去把高汙染高勞動丟給這些地方,現在也不可能讓你與美國一起享受金融成果,所以這些中美間夾縫國,與中國在經濟地位上,就是純粹的競爭者關係,至少到2008年金融海嘯前是如此,因此冷戰結束後,這些國家與中國的敵對局勢,並沒有隨冷戰遠去而逐漸平緩,反而是和緩幾年後就重新開始對立,對立局勢甚至越升越高,表面上是軍事與領土問題,實際上還是經濟問題.
金融海嘯後,歐美日的市場衰退,中共政策從強化外銷變成強化內需,中國從世界工廠變世界市場,但因為低階產品還是老共自己人生產,島鏈國與東南亞除了若干高階產業外,經濟上與中國敵對態勢依舊;可是美國就不同了,美國想重新振興生產業,但本國市場給金融海嘯打擊後,幾年內沒有指望,歐洲則是歐債,現在還為了烏克蘭又鬧能源問題,同樣是幾年內沒指望,中國市場就是唯一有望的市場了.
美國重返東亞,很多人解釋為壓抑中國,不能說沒有這個意圖,但這其實是島鏈國與東南亞的期望,美國自己的鷹派固然是與島鏈國及東南亞同一陣線,但另外一派卻是要進一步打開中國市場,畢竟汽車電視之類賺很多錢的商品,這兩三年大陸都變成全球最大市場,有些如4K電視等平均價格10倍的高階品,大陸市場甚至占全球84%!而這就是美國對蕭萬長郭台銘提案的背景,因為美國也很清楚,老共與美國談判條件絕不鬆綁,但是與台灣談判卻是不妨讓利,美國要台灣讓利又不困難......
中美能否妥協?如果島鏈國與東南亞都變成美國的州,那還真難講,畢竟大陸市場大,但大陸的軍事外交卻不一定與美國同步,美國內部主張有好幾種;但是島鏈國與東南亞的態度,卻是唯恐雙方不對立,鬧越大越好,免得工作被大陸搶走......
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題外話,台灣呢?小弟覺得太陽花與1894年的東學黨很像,只差台灣不是中美兩國同步駐兵的地方...... |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 12:41:46
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quote:
Originally posted by dasha
xk2013兄推薦的書還沒看,不過藉這標題講一下另外的新聞事件,不離題也與xk2013兄講的那本書有關.
週二看好幾本日本的財經雜誌時,忘了是Diamond還是日經還是哪本,裡面用新聞的方式講到台灣的太陽花,然後說,太陽花前半年發生一件事情,蕭萬長帶郭台銘等去美國,要談有沒有機會加入TPP,因為21世紀內,南韓已經談了至少43個相關合作國,一堆大國,台灣只有7個,其中5個還是老早就有合作關係的中南美小國,剩下兩個也不大,所以希望藉由TPP突破,一次增加十幾個,而且是包括美國這種大國.然後美國給的建議:你們去找大陸談一談,大家一起以某種形式進來.當然,給學生一搞,破局了,現在台灣可真是北朝鮮化--如果以後學者不會創"台灣化"這個詞,當作比北朝鮮化更誇張的狀況的話......
雖然日本台灣講到中美關係,通常就當成是類似美蘇冷戰那種競爭關係,但這其實是美中兩國夾縫間國家的一種期望,不包含美國的所有態度.美國對中國的看法,大概從1940年開始,就覺得可以聯中制日蘇,當然也要聯日制中;中國一面倒向蘇聯時,美國也就只好全力扶植日本,等到中美關係正常化,美國就開始強迫日圓升值,替美國支撐全球經濟,結束與台灣的關係,以中制蘇,降低島鏈國家的重要性.
冷戰後的狀況,就更複雜,有的認為中美勢將對立,要重新扶植島鏈國家;但有的卻認為可以把高汙染高勞動的生產丟給中國,由美國享受金融成果,島鏈國家成為可有可無的牽制.相對的,東南亞或日韓台的立場比較簡單,美國過去把高汙染高勞動丟給這些地方,現在也不可能讓你與美國一起享受金融成果,所以這些中美間夾縫國,與中國在經濟地位上,就是純粹的競爭者關係,至少到2008年金融海嘯前是如此,因此冷戰結束後,這些國家與中國的敵對局勢,並沒有隨冷戰遠去而逐漸平緩,反而是和緩幾年後就重新開始對立,對立局勢甚至越升越高,表面上是軍事與領土問題,實際上還是經濟問題.
金融海嘯後,歐美日的市場衰退,中共政策從強化外銷變成強化內需,中國從世界工廠變世界市場,但因為低階產品還是老共自己人生產,島鏈國與東南亞除了若干高階產業外,經濟上與中國敵對態勢依舊;可是美國就不同了,美國想重新振興生產業,但本國市場給金融海嘯打擊後,幾年內沒有指望,歐洲則是歐債,現在還為了烏克蘭又鬧能源問題,同樣是幾年內沒指望,中國市場就是唯一有望的市場了.
美國重返東亞,很多人解釋為壓抑中國,不能說沒有這個意圖,但這其實是島鏈國與東南亞的期望,美國自己的鷹派固然是與島鏈國及東南亞同一陣線,但另外一派卻是要進一步打開中國市場,畢竟汽車電視之類賺很多錢的商品,這兩三年大陸都變成全球最大市場,有些如4K電視等平均價格10倍的高階品,大陸市場甚至占全球84%!而這就是美國對蕭萬長郭台銘提案的背景,因為美國也很清楚,老共與美國談判條件絕不鬆綁,但是與台灣談判卻是不妨讓利,美國要台灣讓利又不困難......
中美能否妥協?如果島鏈國與東南亞都變成美國的州,那還真難講,畢竟大陸市場大,但大陸的軍事外交卻不一定與美國同步,美國內部主張有好幾種;但是島鏈國與東南亞的態度,卻是唯恐雙方不對立,鬧越大越好,免得工作被大陸搶走......
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題外話,台灣呢?小弟覺得太陽花與1894年的東學黨很像,只差台灣不是中美兩國同步駐兵的地方......
怀特这本书我之所以推荐看，是因为这本书是第一次西方政治圈的学者以很严肃的态度和严谨的逻辑主张为什么中美必须分享领导权才是最好的选择——前提是，中美对抗为什么会将给整个亚太带来灾难性后果。
他在这本书里对西方流行的一些观点，如不能慕尼黑，如还有时间等等看，如新冷战没关系，如中美对抗美国会赢……，做出了逻辑上很强有力的反驳。
他作为圈内人的分析是非常透彻和冷静，没有任何幻想，这确实是值得一看的战略分析。
然后关于老兄说的问题，其实涉及到中美冲突一个和过去美苏冷战根本不同的问题。TPP是什么？是第二个马歇尔计划吗？是美国为了对抗中国又一次要对盟国撒钱了吗？
正好相反，TPP是希望打开盟国的市场，从盟国兜里掏钱，建立一套更高的市场开放和知识产权标准来压迫中国接受，进一步打开中国市场。一句话，地主兜里也没余粮了，指望美国再如冷战那样对盟国撒钱来遏制中国是不可能了，相反的，要遏制中国，需要美国的盟国做出牺牲。
就算TPP成功了，参加TPP的国家就能对中国关闭打开的市场了吗？就能对中国产品征收更高关税了？真当WTO不存在啊？中国现在已经是世界第二大市场，是100多个国家的最大贸易伙伴，而且还在高速增长中，中国超越美国成为世界最大市场，只是时间而已，把世界最大市场排挤出世界贸易体系？怀特这本书就分析，美国90年代的接触遏制双重战略有个前提，就是如果当时美国愿意，美国可以通过贸易制裁把中国赶出世界市场，而现在，这已经不可能了。
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change.she
路人甲乙丙
956 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 13:16:06
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沒有說要把中國趕出世界市場啊?
只是說美國有可能藉由台灣當作跳板進入中國市場啊!
這才是今天美國最終的目的吧!
其他所謂南海問題、台灣問題都是無足輕重的。
可是對中國而言他的最終目的到底是甚麼?
我想可能連他自己都不太明白吧?
所以才會嚷著要成為亞洲的霸主，
可是成為亞洲霸主做甚麼呢?
中國完全無需這些國家的市場呀?
要成為霸主然後以自己的利益為優先，
也要先想清楚自己的利益是些甚麼，
別人才不會無所適從。
正是因為中國對自己的利益交代不清，
建構的軍力卻遠超過對外保護自身安全的能力，
然後歷史上東亞這些國家又曾經和中國交戰過，
所以大家對中國的崛起才會如此疑慮。
附帶一提：
最近新聞報導似乎中國有意解決朝鮮問題了。
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gdlz
路人甲乙丙
1255 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 14:38:45
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quote:
Originally posted by change.she
沒有說要把中國趕出世界市場啊?
只是說美國有可能藉由台灣當作跳板進入中國市場啊!
這才是今天美國最終的目的吧!
其他所謂南海問題、台灣問題都是無足輕重的。
可是對中國而言他的最終目的到底是甚麼?
我想可能連他自己都不太明白吧?
所以才會嚷著要成為亞洲的霸主，
可是成為亞洲霸主做甚麼呢?
中國完全無需這些國家的市場呀?
要成為霸主然後以自己的利益為優先，
也要先想清楚自己的利益是些甚麼，
別人才不會無所適從。
正是因為中國對自己的利益交代不清，
建構的軍力卻遠超過對外保護自身安全的能力，
然後歷史上東亞這些國家又曾經和中國交戰過，
所以大家對中國的崛起才會如此疑慮。
附帶一提：
最近新聞報導似乎中國有意解決朝鮮問題了。
这些问题，建议你跳开台湾媒体去尋找。台灣的媒體環境太惡質化了。
直接去中国外交部商务部交通部等等所有涉及對外政策的黨八股以及每一個五年計劃里的規劃展望找答案。
共黨的策略都是陽謀，他想干什麽其實一早就告訴你了 |
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cwchang2100
我是老鳥
Cayman Islands
17243 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 15:56:22
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quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
怀特这本书我之所以推荐看，是因为这本书是第一次西方政治圈的学者以很严肃的态度和严谨的逻辑主张为什么中美必须分享领导权才是最好的选择——前提是，中美对抗为什么会将给整个亚太带来灾难性后果。
他在这本书里对西方流行的一些观点，如不能慕尼黑，如还有时间等等看，如新冷战没关系，如中美对抗美国会赢……，做出了逻辑上很强有力的反驳。
他作为圈内人的分析是非常透彻和冷静，没有任何幻想，这确实是值得一看的战略分析。
然后关于老兄说的问题，其实涉及到中美冲突一个和过去美苏冷战根本不同的问题。TPP是什么？是第二个马歇尔计划吗？是美国为了对抗中国又一次要对盟国撒钱了吗？
正好相反，TPP是希望打开盟国的市场，从盟国兜里掏钱，建立一套更高的市场开放和知识产权标准来压迫中国接受，进一步打开中国市场。一句话，地主兜里也没余粮了，指望美国再如冷战那样对盟国撒钱来遏制中国是不可能了，相反的，要遏制中国，需要美国的盟国做出牺牲。
就算TPP成功了，参加TPP的国家就能对中国关闭打开的市场了吗？就能对中国产品征收更高关税了？真当WTO不存在啊？中国现在已经是世界第二大市场，是100多个国家的最大贸易伙伴，而且还在高速增长中，中国超越美国成为世界最大市场，只是时间而已，把世界最大市场排挤出世界贸易体系？怀特这本书就分析，美国90年代的接触遏制双重战略有个前提，就是如果当时美国愿意，美国可以通过贸易制裁把中国赶出世界市场，而现在，这已经不可能了。
不知道是看翻譯的,還是原文?!
作者並不是這樣的意思.
原文是:
.... The relationship between the world's two richest and strongest states will always
be competitive; the question is whether that competition still allows them trade
and invest with each other, cooperate to solve shared problems, and contribute to
maintain stable international order.
....
They are important because serious rivalry with China would be very costly and
dangerous, and conflict could be catastrophic.
.....
沒有任何人天真到說中美不會競爭.中美是否“對抗"的話,要看方式,
廣義上的對抗如同競爭(competition)是"註定"存在的.
用"中美對抗",是很不精准的說法.太多的模糊,變成無意義.
"衝突"(conflict)是災難性的,並非”對抗"是災難性的.
分享領導權的想法並不止於中國,還包括日本和印度(a concert of Asia).
其實就是要打破零和遊戲的迷思.
但最終還是要實現美國利益(不管是長短期)的最大化.
不要把抑制中國當成第一目標.
有時兩者都獲利,只要歐美獲利比中國大就行了.
領導權就是當老大,當老大常常是要撒錢或自我犧牲保小弟的,
某些不划算的老大,就讓別國(含中國)去當就好了,美國不用事事出頭.
書本來是相當好的,就怕很多人只斷章取義,或自我解釋到自己想像的部分.
那恐怕會讓作者吐血.更多的延伸,就是腦洞開太大了.
最後還是要強調一次作者開宗明義的前提,兩大國的競爭是無可避免的! (總是有競爭的)
無視這個現實,會嚴重曲解作者其他的論點.
PS:
http://www.amazon.com/China-Choice-Should-Share-Power-ebook/dp/B00EDHTRBO/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1399616409&sr=1-1&keywords=The+China+Choice
Kindle版比較便宜,US$11.99.
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Edited by - cwchang2100 on 05/09/2014 16:18:57 |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 17:56:12
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quote:
Originally posted by cwchang2100
quote:
Originally posted by xk2013
怀特这本书我之所以推荐看，是因为这本书是第一次西方政治圈的学者以很严肃的态度和严谨的逻辑主张为什么中美必须分享领导权才是最好的选择——前提是，中美对抗为什么会将给整个亚太带来灾难性后果。
他在这本书里对西方流行的一些观点，如不能慕尼黑，如还有时间等等看，如新冷战没关系，如中美对抗美国会赢……，做出了逻辑上很强有力的反驳。
他作为圈内人的分析是非常透彻和冷静，没有任何幻想，这确实是值得一看的战略分析。
然后关于老兄说的问题，其实涉及到中美冲突一个和过去美苏冷战根本不同的问题。TPP是什么？是第二个马歇尔计划吗？是美国为了对抗中国又一次要对盟国撒钱了吗？
正好相反，TPP是希望打开盟国的市场，从盟国兜里掏钱，建立一套更高的市场开放和知识产权标准来压迫中国接受，进一步打开中国市场。一句话，地主兜里也没余粮了，指望美国再如冷战那样对盟国撒钱来遏制中国是不可能了，相反的，要遏制中国，需要美国的盟国做出牺牲。
就算TPP成功了，参加TPP的国家就能对中国关闭打开的市场了吗？就能对中国产品征收更高关税了？真当WTO不存在啊？中国现在已经是世界第二大市场，是100多个国家的最大贸易伙伴，而且还在高速增长中，中国超越美国成为世界最大市场，只是时间而已，把世界最大市场排挤出世界贸易体系？怀特这本书就分析，美国90年代的接触遏制双重战略有个前提，就是如果当时美国愿意，美国可以通过贸易制裁把中国赶出世界市场，而现在，这已经不可能了。
不知道是看翻譯的,還是原文?!
作者並不是這樣的意思.
原文是:
.... The relationship between the world's two richest and strongest states will always
be competitive; the question is whether that competition still allows them trade
and invest with each other, cooperate to solve shared problems, and contribute to
maintain stable international order.
....
They are important because serious rivalry with China would be very costly and
dangerous, and conflict could be catastrophic.
.....
沒有任何人天真到說中美不會競爭.中美是否“對抗"的話,要看方式,
廣義上的對抗如同競爭(competition)是"註定"存在的.
用"中美對抗",是很不精准的說法.太多的模糊,變成無意義.
"衝突"(conflict)是災難性的,並非”對抗"是災難性的.
分享領導權的想法並不止於中國,還包括日本和印度(a concert of Asia).
其實就是要打破零和遊戲的迷思.
但最終還是要實現美國利益(不管是長短期)的最大化.
不要把抑制中國當成第一目標.
有時兩者都獲利,只要歐美獲利比中國大就行了.
領導權就是當老大,當老大常常是要撒錢或自我犧牲保小弟的,
某些不划算的老大,就讓別國(含中國)去當就好了,美國不用事事出頭.
書本來是相當好的,就怕很多人只斷章取義,或自我解釋到自己想像的部分.
那恐怕會讓作者吐血.更多的延伸,就是腦洞開太大了.
最後還是要強調一次作者開宗明義的前提,兩大國的競爭是無可避免的! (總是有競爭的)
無視這個現實,會嚴重曲解作者其他的論點.
PS:
http://www.amazon.com/China-Choice-Should-Share-Power-ebook/dp/B00EDHTRBO/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1399616409&sr=1-1&keywords=The+China+Choice
Kindle版比較便宜,US$11.99.
这本书买的是全翻译中文版，大致上我不认为我的解读有错误：
沒有任何人天真到說中美不會競爭.中美是否“對抗"的話,要看方式,
廣義上的對抗如同競爭(competition)是"註定"存在的.
用"中美對抗",是很不精准的說法.太多的模糊,變成無意義.
"衝突"(conflict)是災難性的,並非”對抗"是災難性的.
……………………………………………………
他这本书核心观点就是主张中美不能在继续这样竞争下去，这样竞争下去会导致大冲突。这会带来灾难。
为什么中美必须分享领导权才是最好的选择——因为中美现在的对抗发展下去会给整个亚太带来灾难性后果。
分享領導權的想法並不止於中國,還包括日本和印度(a concert of Asia).
………………………………………………
他这一段是我完全不赞同的一段，这一段的问题从站在中国感情角度来说，中国可以接受和美国平起平坐，但是绝不可能接受和日本平起平坐。当然，这种分析不需要考虑感情。
但是哪怕站在他自己的分析逻辑上，他主张日本是大国的分析也是不符合他自己的分析逻辑的。日本并不具备，如果日本反对就能推翻整个地区秩序的否决权的能力，实际上这个地区具备这个能力的只有中国和美国。
另外，他对印度和俄国的分析是有很大问题的，他主张一个大国协约应该把印度纳入而没必要把俄国纳入，但是他排斥俄国的理由用在印度身上是完全没问题的。
他主张的中美协约的目地就是，为了和平要首先保证大国的利益，这样才能保证和平（波兰1814-1914年比下一个世纪那个更不幸？），但是他确定大国协约的人选却违背了这个原则。
当然，这是他过于高估了日本和印度造成的。大致上我是认为按他的逻辑确定的大国协约，新的东亚秩序只有两个国家配参与，就是中国和美国。
其實就是要打破零和遊戲的迷思.
但最終還是要實現美國利益(不管是長短期)的最大化.
不要把抑制中國當成第一目標.
有時兩者都獲利,只要歐美獲利比中國大就行了.
領導權就是當老大,當老大常常是要撒錢或自我犧牲保小弟的,
某些不划算的老大,就讓別國(含中國)去當就好了,美國不用事事出頭.
……………………………………………………………………………………
对你这看法他有一段很经典的叙述，如果国际协约一方认为是胜利的，那另一方必然认为自己失败，这样的协议是无法持久的，只有双方都认为自己做出了过多的让步的协议才可能是持久的。
他的书那一章那一段让你认为达成这种中美共同统治亚太的协议美国获利比中国大了？不划算的老大,就讓別國(含中國)去當？真当中国是傻子？当年一战后英法也当美国是傻子，然后美国改当不负责任的大国来给英法拼命拆台了。
他整本书论述的就是随着中国实力的增长，现在这种美国统治的格局再也维持不下去了，无论秀强硬还是搞军备都维持不下去了，要么是惨烈的对抗，其代价是中美无法承受的，要么是中美各让一步，美国必须放弃统治亚洲的想法，中国也要放弃独霸亚洲的想法，建立共同领导的体制。
斷章取義
……………………………………
我手头正好有书，我们可以谈谈看，到底谁在断章取义。
最後還是要強調一次作者開宗明義的前提,兩大國的競爭是無可避免的! (總是有競爭的)
無視這個現實,會嚴重曲解作者其他的論點.
……………………………………………………
自己看作者结论去。
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 18:12:38
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http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4bccaa320102edvv.html
《国际先驱导报》：请首先阐述一下您在《中国抉择》这本书中提出的主要观点。
休·怀特：这本书的主要议题是世界各国、特别是美国应该如何做出抉择，以便应对中国的崛起。我的主要观点是，中国经济实力的增长造成了世界战略力量分配的根本改变。随着中国战略实力的提升，中国将在战略领域，特别是在亚太地区，扮演更为重要、更为积极的角色。那么美国就必须做出选择，来应对中国在战略领域的野心和期待。美国是会抗拒中国的野心，还是会接受？我的观点是美国应该试图接受中国的战略野心，至少应该达到某一种程度，美国应该准备好与中国分享权力，把中国当做平等一方看待。同时，中国也必须做出选择，决定自己到底想达成多大的影响力，想与美国形成一种什么样的关系，包括与地区其他大国比如日本、印度的关系。
今后中美关系如果按照过去几年那样发展下去，我认为，很有可能导致双方竞争更为激烈，关系更为紧张，互视对方为战略对手。尽管双方经贸联系紧密，但我认为中美之间存在敌意的种子。除非北京和华盛顿都做出非常明确的决定，从这一导致敌对的轨道上后退，否则我们可能会发现自己身处一个竞争更加激烈的地区，在这里中美将对方视为对手，爆发冲突的可能性加大。所以为了避免这一切发生，美国和中国都需要从现有的轨道上退后，以一种新的方式考虑双边关系。
大致采访把他观点表述的很清楚了，和书对照基本没有问题。 |
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cwchang2100
我是老鳥
Cayman Islands
17243 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 18:55:29
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要我拿原文和一個拿翻譯本的討論?!
那我一定是腦子有問題.
感覺您連Say Goodbye to Taiwan都沒有真正讀完文章,並了解作者的想法.
Say Goodbye to Taiwan的作者基本上就是建議台灣去搞中國,
只要搞到了痛處,就對台灣有利.
您愛怎麼解釋是您的事,
只是您要知道,懂英文的人很多.
有思考能力的會直接讀原文.
只要對照原文之後,就會讓人覺得您的文章,
和中國外交部發言人講的話差不多.
PS: 您貼了那麼多英文,真的懂嗎???
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 22:19:41
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quote:
Originally posted by cwchang2100
要我拿原文和一個拿翻譯本的討論?!
那我一定是腦子有問題.
感覺您連Say Goodbye to Taiwan都沒有真正讀完文章,並了解作者的想法.
Say Goodbye to Taiwan的作者基本上就是建議台灣去搞中國,
只要搞到了痛處,就對台灣有利.
您愛怎麼解釋是您的事,
只是您要知道,懂英文的人很多.
有思考能力的會直接讀原文.
只要對照原文之後,就會讓人覺得您的文章,
和中國外交部發言人講的話差不多.
PS: 您貼了那麼多英文,真的懂嗎???
如果阁下认为大陆翻译版本那点歪曲了这本书的原意，你可以拿你的英文版指出来，但是我真的很怀疑阁下是否看懂了怀特的那本书，尤其是其最后三章。
至于米尔海默的Say Goodbye to Taiwan，能从这篇文章中读出“建議台灣去搞中國,只要搞到了痛處,就對台灣有利.”真的让我膛目结舌。
Once China becomes a superpower, it probably makes the most sense for Taiwan to give up hope of maintaining its de facto independence and instead pursue the “Hong Kong strategy.” This is definitely not an attractive option, but as Thucydides argued long ago, in international politics “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
By now, it should be glaringly apparent that whether Taiwan is forced to give up its independence largely depends on how formidable China’s military becomes in the decades ahead. Taiwan will surely do everything it can to buy time and maintain the political status quo. But if China continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears destined to become part of China.
THERE IS one set of circumstances under which Taiwan can avoid this scenario. Specifically, all Taiwanese should hope there is a drastic slowdown in Chinese economic growth in the years ahead and that Beijing also has serious political problems on the home front that work to keep it focused inward. If that happens, China will not be in a position to pursue regional hegemony and the United States will be able to protect Taiwan from China, as it does now. In essence, the best way for Taiwan to maintain de facto independence is for China to be economically and militarily weak. Unfortunately for Taiwan, it has no way of influencing events so that this outcome actually becomes reality.
你真的看懂这段了吗？
but as Thucydides argued long ago, in international politics “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
这是要台湾去搞大陆？？？阁下的理解能力就是如此？知道修昔底德记录的这段话的出处是什么吗？ |
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xk2013
路人甲乙丙
1300 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 22:46:31
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quote:
Originally posted by cwchang2100
要我拿原文和一個拿翻譯本的討論?!
那我一定是腦子有問題.
感覺您連Say Goodbye to Taiwan都沒有真正讀完文章,並了解作者的想法.
Say Goodbye to Taiwan的作者基本上就是建議台灣去搞中國,
只要搞到了痛處,就對台灣有利.
您愛怎麼解釋是您的事,
只是您要知道,懂英文的人很多.
有思考能力的會直接讀原文.
只要對照原文之後,就會讓人覺得您的文章,
和中國外交部發言人講的話差不多.
PS: 您貼了那麼多英文,真的懂嗎???
只要對照原文之後,就會讓人覺得您的文章,和中國外交部發言人講的話差不多?米尔斯海默是中國外交部發言人？
有些话其实我之前也说过，这是从米尔斯海默的国际关系理论衍生出的必然结果。我不介意再贴一遍，您可以指出一下，他那些话是主张台灣去搞中國,只要搞到了痛處,就對台灣有利？
WHAT ARE the implications for Taiwan of China’s continued rise? Not today. Not next year. No, the real dilemma Taiwan will confront looms in the decades ahead, when China, whose continued economic growth seems likely although not a sure thing, is far more powerful than it is today.
But power is rarely static. The real question that is often overlooked is what happens in a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against Taiwan and the United States, in which China controls much more relative power than it does today, and in which China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence: a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today. That world may seem forbidding, even ominous, but it is one that may be coming.
Time is not on Taiwan’s side.
However, Taiwan is not going to gain formal independence in the foreseeable future, mainly because China would not tolerate that outcome. In fact, China has made it clear that it would go to war against Taiwan if the island declares its independence. The antisecession law, which China passed in 2005, says explicitly that “the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures” if Taiwan moves toward de jure independence. It is also worth noting that the United States does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, and according to President Obama, Washington “fully supports a one-China policy.”
The nationalism story is straightforward and uncontroversial. China is deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. For China’s elites, as well as its public, Taiwan can never become a sovereign state. It is sacred territory that has been part of China since ancient times, but was taken away by the hated Japanese in 1895—when China was weak and vulnerable. It must once again become an integral part of China. As Hu Jintao said in 2007 at the Seventeenth Party Congress: “The two sides of the Straits are bound to be reunified in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
The unification of China and Taiwan is one of the core elements of Chinese national identity. There is simply no compromising on this issue. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Chinese regime is bound up with making sure Taiwan does not become a sovereign state and that it eventually becomes an integral part of China.
Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold sooner rather than later and that hopefully it can be done peacefully. At the same time, they have made it clear that force is an option if they have no other recourse.
While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today.
In addition, geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage.
One might argue that there is a simple way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will not have an effective conventional deterrent against China in the not-too-distant future: put America’s nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This approach will not solve the problem, however, because the United States is not going to escalate to the nuclear level if Taiwan is being overrun by China. The stakes are not high enough to risk a general thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or even South Korea. Thus, the smart strategy for America is to not even try to extend its nuclear deterrent over Taiwan.
There was no flashpoint between the superpowers during the Cold War that was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a Sino-American security competition. Some commentators liken Berlin in the Cold War to Taiwan, but Berlin was not sacred territory for the Soviet Union and it was actually of little strategic importance for either side. Taiwan is different. Given how dangerous it is for precipitating a war and given the fact that the United States will eventually reach the point where it cannot defend Taiwan, there is a reasonable chance that American policy makers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense to abandon Taiwan and allow China to coerce it into accepting unification.
No doubt Taiwan still has time to acquire a nuclear deterrent before the balance of power in Asia shifts decisively against it. But the problem with this suggestion is that both Beijing and Washington are sure to oppose Taiwan going nuclear. The United States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear weapons, not only because they would encourage Japan and South Korea to follow suit, but also because American policy makers abhor the idea of an ally being in a position to start a nuclear war that might ultimately involve the United States. To put it bluntly, no American wants to be in a situation where Taiwan can precipitate a conflict that might result in a massive nuclear attack on the United States.
China will adamantly oppose Taiwan obtaining a nuclear deterrent, in large part because Beijing surely understands that it would make it difficult—maybe even impossible—to conquer Taiwan. What’s more, China will recognize that Taiwanese nuclear weapons would facilitate nuclear proliferation in East Asia, which would not only limit China’s ability to throw its weight around in that region, but also would increase the likelihood that any conventional war that breaks out would escalate to the nuclear level. For these reasons, China is likely to make it manifestly clear that if Taiwan decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it will strike its nuclear facilities, and maybe even launch a war to conquer the island. In short, it appears that it is too late for Taiwan to pursue the nuclear option.
Finally, although it is difficult to predict just how dominant China will become in the distant future, it is possible that it will eventually become so powerful that Taiwan will be unable to put up major resistance against a Chinese onslaught. This would certainly be true if America’s commitment to defend Taiwan weakens as China morphs into a superpower.
“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
aiwan appears destined to become part of China.
Unfortunately for Taiwan, it has no way of influencing events so that this outcome actually becomes reality. |
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cwchang2100
我是老鳥
Cayman Islands
17243 Posts |
Posted - 05/09/2014 : 23:21:18
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只要看他說保持"實際上"的獨立是對台灣最好,最糟的結果是和中國統一.
這個立場和價值觀有多鮮明,明眼人一看就知道.
您如果認為他的想法是要放棄台灣,靠向中國.
那就儘量自欺欺人吧.
如果連作者的立場都搞不清楚,
那不是太傻,就是很盡責的發言人.
你我的想法,就如現在台灣和中國大多數人的看法一樣,
是兩條不相交的平行線,誰也說服不了誰.
就別浪費時間啦!
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標題 |
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真正的G2大妥協的可能性？
