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路人甲乙丙
1507 Posts |
 Posted - 08/26/2010 : 01:25:06
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quote:
Originally posted by toga
要根據以上邏輯，台灣事實上幾可說沒有一件產品是能自製的∼近乎100%的金屬原料與絕大多數石化原料，台灣都得靠進口而非自產。
只要有辦法確保來源供應無虞以及對外銷售不因此受限，在所謂自製產品上採用適當可靠的舶來品也沒什麼不好的，Gripen戰機上超過40%的元件是老英老美老德貨，照樣不妨害瑞典視其為自主國防的結晶力作，以及在幾次對外銷售中成功擊敗老美F-16；而無視國情能力一昧追求全面國造，在許多時候也會對國防計畫造成災難性影響∼與IDF同時期展開的印度LCA Tejas戰機計畫便因為長期堅持一定要使用自製發動機（雖然以印度的國情與外交而言，此舉無甚必要），結果讓計畫推遲延宕快20年，最後扶不起的自製發動機終究是扶不起，印度空軍還是得向英美開標引進F414 or EJ-200，才能讓LCA Tejas戰機的量產計畫繼續進行下去。
一萌二PAK三聯閃，四代歐風五國潘，十全側衛百戰鷹，成千蟲隼萬國繁。
所以才會有政黨主張關閉工業園區大規模補償農業禁止徵收農地開發阿
你可以去嘗試，說IDF是台灣國防工業自製的結晶，馬上會有一堆天才出來說引擎沒有老美哪能飛，基本上一定要把這個驕傲丕成體無完膚項大變一樣
台灣人士不允許有驕傲的 |
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shih1513
剛剛入門
Taiwan
43 Posts |
Posted - 08/26/2010 : 13:10:42
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quote:
Originally posted by BlueWhaleMoon
quote:
Originally posted by toga
與IDF同時期展開的印度LCA Tejas戰機計畫便因為長期堅持一定要使用自製發動機（雖然以印度的國情與外交而言，此舉無甚必要），結果讓計畫推遲延宕快20年，最後扶不起的自製發動機終究是扶不起，印度空軍還是得向英美開標引進F414 or EJ-200，才能讓LCA Tejas戰機的量產計畫繼續進行下去。
這一點老共就很聰明, 俄國的引擎用的很快樂.
並沒有吧...
老俄的引擎目前在對岸還是當成太行那些自製引擎可靠度提升前的過度品 |
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toga
版主
Tajikistan
12781 Posts |
Posted - 05/13/2011 : 16:21:27
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美國國會文件，1990至2010年對台軍售全記錄：
柴電潛艇案：
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf
In November 2001, seven companies submitted bids and concept papers to the Department of the Navy. Companies interested in the contract reportedly include U.S. manufacturers, Northrop Grumman (with its Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard) and General Dynamics (with its Electric Boat shipyard); Germany’s HDW; the Netherlands’ RDM (which sold its Zwaardvis-class submarine design to Taiwan in the 1980s for two Hai Lung [Sea Dragon]-class submarines); France’s DCN; and Spain’s IZAR (now Navantia). Although the Administration promised to help Taiwan buy submarines, not build them, Taiwan’s China Shipbuilding Corporation also became interested in a part of the contract, with support from some of Taiwan’s legislators. The U.S. Navy discussed options with Taiwan’s Navy in July 2002 and initially planned to select the manufacturer(s) to design and build the submarines in the latter half of 2003. On December 6, 2002, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England informed Congress in a Determination and Findings memo that bidding would be limited to four U.S. companies and the diesel subs would be of U.S. origin.
The U.S. Navy held a second Industry Day on December 17, 2002, with General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon interested in being the prime contractor. The U.S. Navy provided the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) on January 17, 2003. The ICE put the sub program at about $10.5 billion, but private sector estimates have been said to be lower (perhaps $6-7 billion). Greater risks and costs were factored into the ICE because of uncertainty about funding by Taiwan and the availability of European designs.
However, by April 2003, the sale became at risk, when the United States and Taiwan reached an impasse over the program start-up costs estimated by the U.S. Navy at $333 million, but offered at $28.5 million by Taiwan. On May 20-23, 2003, Taiwan’s Navy sent a delegation led by Vice Admiral Kao Yang to Washington to discuss the issue, but the differences reportedly remained unresolved. Facing the delays in Taiwan’s commitment of funds (although it first requested submarines in 1995) and a long acquisition process, the Administration then viewed the program as a long-term solution for Taiwan that would not meet the near-term blockade and submarine threats posed by the PLA Navy. Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming told visiting AIT Chairwoman Therese Shaheen on October 16, 2003, that Taiwan still placed a high priority on acquiring the submarines. Meanwhile, in 2003, the Bush Administration inquired with Italy about buying eight decommissioning Sauro-class diesel-electric submarines for the estimated cost of about $2 billion for delivery starting in 2006, but Taiwan’s military opted for new subs. A team from the U.S. Navy’s International Program Office arrived in Taipei in October 2003, for further talks on whether Taiwan will procure submarines.71 The U.S. team also met with some of Taiwan’s legislators, including Lin Yu-fang of the opposition People First Party. Lin was one of the sponsors of legislation passed in May 2002, requiring Taiwan’s navy to arrange for six of the eight submarines to be built in Taiwan using technology transfers. The total cost of new submarines was estimated at $9-12 billion, leading Taiwan’s political leaders to consider a controversial Special Budget. (See discussion on budgets below.)
Taiwan’s new demand for domestic industrial participation had added another issue and greater potential costs to the program (about $2.5 billion to the total), which U.S. Navy officials discussed with potential prime contractors at the third Industry Day meeting on December 15, 2003, in Washington. However, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told Taiwan’s visiting legislative delegation on June 21, 2004, that the Bush Administration approved Taiwan’s request for assistance in purchasing submarines but was opposed to Taiwan’s new proposal to build them in Taiwan. With U.S. opposition to Taiwan' s domestic production of submarines conveyed in official letters from the Defense Department in May and July 2004, Minister of Defense Lee Jye estimated that the cost of the submarines could be reduced. Depending on the funds ultimately approved in Taiwan, the scope of a program could be restricted to fewer than eight boats. Thus, with delays in Taiwan’s decision-making after 2001, Taiwan’s request for and the Bush Administration’s approval of a sale of submarines met with mixed opinions in Taipei and Washington. In early 2003, officials in the Bush Administration stressed ASW surveillance as one priority for Taiwan’s military to consider, with the focus on static arrays and patrol aircraft to track submarines. The Administration approved submarines but did not consider them a priority.
In early 2006, articles appeared alleging that the U.S. Navy failed to effectively implement the diesel sub program for Taiwan, in part to protect the nuclear-powered submarine capability. The Defense Department and the Navy repeated that they supported President Bush’s 2001 policy decision on arms sales to Taiwan, but that Taiwan must commit to fund the program. In February 2006, Representative Rob Simmons visited Taiwan, saying that he represented his district in Connecticut, home to General Dynamics’ Electric Boat shipyard. In a speech at the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, Simmons suggested that the subs could cost less, perhaps around $8 billion, and proposed an interim step to break the impasse whereby Taiwan could procure a sub design first, costing perhaps $225 million. The Navy and DSCA said that Taiwan could first submit a request for a sub design phase. On April 3, 2006, Taiwan’s military submitted a request for U.S. assessment of the feasibility of using two phases (design then perhaps construction). Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless conveyed the U.S. policy response to Taiwan’s defense minister in an official letter on June 27, 2006, stating that a two-phased approach was “legally permissible and administratively feasible.” However, Lawless warned that such a program likely would increase costs and risks, making foreign design firms and their governments less willing to participate. The Defense Department estimated the design phase to cost $360 million, if Taiwan requested it. Following Lawless' letter, Representative Rob Simmons wrote a letter to Defense Minister Lee Jye on July 17, noting that the next step was for Taiwan to request a letter of offer or acceptance for a phased approach to the design and acquisition of subs. In answer to a question posed by Representative Rob Simmons at a meeting of the Congressional Shipbuilding Caucus on September 27, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England wrote that his department stood ready to support the U.S. effort to help Taiwan acquire submarines, if Taiwan provided the necessary funds.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy requested funds from Taiwan to keep an office to manage the sub program and reportedly warned Taiwan in August 2005 that the “pre-selection” process would stop without such funds. Through March 2006, Taiwan paid $7.5 million to retain the office. On June 15, 2007, Taiwan’s legislature passed the 2007 defense budget with $6 million to fund a “feasibility study” (with LY participation) and did not commit to the design phase or full procurement of submarines (the two U.S.-approved options). Representative James Langevin expressed concerns in a letter to the Secretary of Defense and asked for a review of the U.S. proposal to Taiwan. For the study, a LY delegation met with companies and officials in the United States in August 2007. The LY delegation was positive about its visit but did not reach a conclusion about the sub procurement. In September 2007, the stance of the KMT’s presidential candidate, Ma Ying-yeou, was to support the sub purchase, but a KMT legislator who was in the LY delegation of August suggested a possible “new list” of arms requests depending on the outcome of the presidential election in March 2008.
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry requested in the 2008 defense budget about US$169 million as the first of three annual installments for the design phase (total of US$360 million). The LY’s defense committee kept the requested amount in the defense budget that it approved in October 2007, but the question of procurement was left for inter-party negotiations and the full LY to address. In December 2007, the LY approved the 2008 defense budget with the funds for the sub program cut to US$ 61.5 million. With one sixth of the required amount, questions arose about Taiwan’s full funding for the design phase and how the U.S. Navy would be able to execute the first phase as approved by the Defense Department in June 2006. Nevertheless, in January 2008, Navy Secretary Donald Winter assured Representative Joe Courtney that Taiwan was required to commit to fully fund phase one and incremental payments would be acceptable. Later in January 2008, the Navy accepted Taiwan’s Letter of Request (LOR) for the sub design phase. Then, a Navy team visited Taiwan in March 2008 to discuss details of the program. However, on October 3, 2008, after the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became president in May, the Bush Administration did not submit for congressional review the pending submarine design program, while notifying Congress of six other proposed arms sales to Taiwan. Representative Courtney wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on October 6, 2008, to inquire about the status of the submarine design program given the failure to notify Congress. Reportedly, in 2008, President Ma reevaluated then reaffirmed the program (adjusted with a goal of some local construction, if not development). In his public remarks delivered to the United States on April 22, 2009, President Ma affirmed to the Obama Administration Taiwan’s continued commitment to request the sub design program. Also, in late 2009, Taiwan’s LY and military remained committed to the procurement of new submarines. However, like President Bush, President Obama did not submit for congressional review the pending program for a submarine design when he notified Congress of five other programs in January 2010. Despite U.S.-Taiwan commitments, the Obama Administration claimed it made no decision to rule in or rule out the submarine program, even though the United States could have given Taiwan a clear answer of denial. Prospects for the sub program appeared to be unlikely as a U.S. FMS program. Taiwan’s alternatives included domestic construction and/or commercial contracts, including for small subs. Still, on January 25, 2011, President Ma reiterated to visiting AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt Taiwan’s need to buy U.S. submarines (and F-16C/D fighters) to replace its aging equipment (that could be four boats). Also, Shuai Hua-ming, a key legislator on defense in the LY’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, visited Washington on February 10-11, and reaffirmed a need for subs.
一萌二PAK三聯閃，四代歐風五國潘，十全側衛百戰鷹，成千蟲隼萬國繁。 |
Edited by - toga on 05/14/2011 00:54:05 |
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Captain Picard
我是老鳥
9669 Posts |
Posted - 05/13/2011 : 23:42:52
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quote:
Originally posted by toga
美國國會文件，1990至2010年對台軍售全記錄：
柴電潛艇案：
很眼熟的文字，小弟先前寫MDC站上的光華八號文章時，有參考一篇中文譯文當作主要資料，原來就是這個。當然現在又補了些2008年以後的事情。
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天佑吾「王」！ |
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toga
版主
Tajikistan
12781 Posts |
Posted - 05/14/2011 : 22:11:34
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2001年11月，七家歐美造船公司向美國海軍部提出售台柴電潛艇案企劃構想報告，其中包括諾葛集團，通用動力，德國HDW，荷蘭RDM，法國DCN，以及西班牙IZAR。
2002年7月，美國海軍與台灣海軍討論造艦選擇方案，當時計畫在2003年下半葉選定承包商，開始設計造艦。
2002年12月6日，美國海軍決定從四家美商（諾葛集團，通用動力，洛馬集團，雷松集團）中選出為台建造柴潛者。
2003年1月17日，美國海軍提出售台柴電計畫總成本估計（Independent Cost Estimate／ICE），由於歐洲各國似乎皆無意提供現成設計，以至於風險與成本相對提高，美方估計可能需要105億美金（雖然一些私人機構估算若計畫順利的話，也許只要60至70億美金便足夠）∼消息一傳出，馬上在台灣朝野掀起喧然大波。
2003年4月，美方提出以3億3,300萬美金作為柴電計畫正式啟動預算，但是台灣只肯提供2,850萬美金；雙方於該年5月間於華府開會試圖解決歧見，但最終仍是無解。
眼見台灣似乎毫無不惜血本代價也要搞定柴電案的真正決心，美方遂建議乾脆以當時甫從義大利海軍退役的掃羅級SSK為基礎，加以整修改裝後，估計從2006年起便能在ROCN成軍，而且在價碼上估計也只需要20億美金左右.......但是在當時台灣自認已經天身貴骨，非用新貨不可的美學堅持下，計畫破局。
造新艦不肯花錢，用舊船修改又不屑，連計畫啟動費用都要一塊給一毛...........你到底是想怎麼樣？？2003年10月，美國海軍國際計畫辦公室派人前往台灣協商，以弄清台灣是否真心誠意要委請老美為其搞定柴電潛艇案，結果林郁方立委又在其拜會期間提出八艘柴電中的六艘必需技轉授權在台興建之要求。
美國海軍官員估計台灣的此一要求會讓預估總成本已達90至120億美金的柴電計畫再增加25億美金的額外費用，而小布希政府原本就只是同意出面為台張羅八艘柴電潛艇並為本國造船廠創造工作機會，可不是開為台扶植潛艦興建能力的善堂，於是在2004年6月21日，美方正式否決台灣方面此一的要求。
2006年年初，美國海軍否認其在售台柴潛案從中作梗的傳言，但表示如果計畫想要繼續進行下去，台灣方面就得開始出資掏錢。
2006年二月，美國國會議員Rob Simmons 代表通用動力Electric Boat 造船廠訪台，其表示售台柴潛案的總成本也許可以在80億美金的範圍內搞定，並表示台灣方面如不願一次投下大錢冒大險，也可以先出錢（其估計約需2億2,500萬美金）請美國造船廠為台進行柴電潛艇設計，然後等看過設計圖後再決定要不要繼續下去。
2006年三月，台灣方面付出750萬美金以維持售台柴潛計畫辦公室的運作。
2006年四月至九月，台灣方面詢問是否可如Rob Simmons建議般將柴電計畫分成設計與興建兩階段執行，也獲美國政府與造船商首肯，並預估在設計階段的所需費用為3億6,000萬美金。
2007年6月15日，立法院所通過的國防預算中，以600萬美金預算進行柴潛引進可行性研究。
台灣國防部在2008年國防預算案中提出分三年支付售台柴潛設計階段的所需費用，並預定在第一年支付1億6,900萬；結果在2007年12月立法院所通過的國防預算中，此一金額被砍成6,150萬美金，約是美方要求金額的1/6。
2008年10月3日，小布希政府任內最後一次對國會通知對台軍售案，柴電潛艇案被排除在外。
2010年1月，歐巴馬政府上任後第一次對國會通知對台軍售案，柴電潛艇案繼續被排除在外。
之後，似乎便只剩臺灣在那唱獨角戲..........
Despite U.S.-Taiwan commitments, the Obama Administration claimed it made no decision to rule in or rule out the submarine program, even though the United States could have given Taiwan a clear answer of denial. Prospects for the sub program appeared to be unlikely as a U.S. FMS program.
Taiwan’s alternatives included domestic construction and/or commercial contracts, including for small subs. Still, on January 25, 2011, President Ma reiterated to visiting AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt Taiwan’s need to buy U.S. submarines (and F-16C/D fighters) to replace its aging equipment (that could be four boats). Also, Shuai Hua-ming, a key legislator on defense in the LY’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, visited Washington on February 10-11, and reaffirmed a need for subs.
一萌二PAK三聯閃，四代歐風五國潘，十全側衛百戰鷹，成千蟲隼萬國繁。 |
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toga
版主
Tajikistan
12781 Posts |
Posted - 05/23/2011 : 09:41:53
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根據美國國會報告，在2006年至2007年間，小布希政權對台灣在柴電潛艇案歹戲拖棚推拖拉的怒火，高漲到台灣連續三次向美方遞交F-16C/D採購意向書，老美連看都不看就全部丟回來的地步。
所以有人質疑為何馬政府自2008年間上台後不再向美方遞交F-16C/D採購意向書？？個人的猜測是其根據外交國安管道所得到的訊息而心中有數，就算現在四度向美方遞交F-16C/D採購意向書的下場也不會比前面三次好到哪裡去，到時要和人民解釋其如何代表”台美關係大幅改善，水到渠成”（蘇起言）起來可就麻煩了，所以乾脆自導自演一連串”我方正在努力爭取中”的獨角戲，然後美方則一概回以”我方正在慎重考慮中”的樣板回應，雙方互不戳破，然後各自都有臺階可下。
一萌二PAK三聯閃，四代歐風五國潘，十全側衛百戰鷹，成千蟲隼萬國繁。 |
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cchs
路人甲乙丙
Taiwan
2212 Posts |
Posted - 05/23/2011 : 16:29:06
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quote:
Originally posted by toga
根據美國國會報告，在2006年至2007年間，小布希政權對台灣在柴電潛艇案歹戲拖棚推拖拉的怒火，高漲到台灣連續三次向美方遞交F-16C/D採購意向書，老美連看都不看就全部丟回來的地步。
所以有人質疑為何馬政府自2008年間上台後不再向美方遞交F-16C/D採購意向書？？個人的猜測是其根據外交國安管道所得到的訊息而心中有數，就算現在四度向美方遞交F-16C/D採購意向書的下場也不會比前面三次好到哪裡去，到時要和人民解釋其如何代表”台美關係大幅改善，水到渠成”（蘇起言）起來可就麻煩了，所以乾脆自導自演一連串”我方正在努力爭取中”的獨角戲，然後美方則一概回以”我方正在慎重考慮中”的樣板回應，雙方互不戳破，然後各自都有臺階可下。
一萌二PAK三聯閃，四代歐風五國潘，十全側衛百戰鷹，成千蟲隼萬國繁。
USA want us to express clear Political message that we want to be ROC or Taiwan or Formosa............
C4I R & D center CEO 2003~ |
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Captain Picard
我是老鳥
9669 Posts |
Posted - 05/23/2011 : 17:52:36
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來自於這段文字。其中提到的小布希政府與扁政府關係惡化具體事件是入聯公投，但是潛艦案的拖拉顯然也是重要因素之一，把台灣的credit敗盡。
F-16C/D Fighters
Since 2006, Taiwan has been trying to request to procure new F-16C/D fighters, to add to its existing F-16 force. In 2006, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry requested initial funding from the LY to
acquire 66 F-16C/D fighters and to boost the defense budget in 2007 (an attempt to reach 2.85% of GDP).
123 On November 6, 2006, the LY’s defense and budget committees jointly passed an amended 2007 defense budget, which froze the requested budget for F-16C/D fighters for five months (ending on May 31, 2007), pending U.S. provision of price and availability data. When
the LY passed the final 2007 defense budget on June 15, 2007, the deadline for releasing the funds (about $488 million) for F-16C/Ds was extended until October 31. In the LY, there wasbroad political support for procurement of new fighters, but there was uncertainty about next steps if President Bush did not approve the release of pricing data (a potential sale). The Bush Administration refused even to accept a formal Letter of Request (LOR) for F-16C/D
fighters, after Taiwan tried to submit one in July 2006, February 2007, and June 2007.124
Nonetheless, in October 2007, the LY’s defense committee passed a 2008 defense budget that retained the requested F-16 procurement program.
In December 2007, inter-party negotiations
and the final decision in the LY deleted NT$2.2 billion from NT$22.2 billion leaving NT$20 billion (US$615 million). But the whole amount was frozen pending U.S. price and availability data. On September 22, 2008, Defense Minister Chen Chao-min reported to the LY that the
military needed to acquire the new F-16 fighters. The Defense Ministry had to return the unspent funds in the 2007 defense budget and needed to return the funds in the 2008 budget.
In 2006, President Bush reportedly was reluctant to consider a formal request for new F-16 fighters without Taiwan’s resolution of pending arms sales and without a 2007 defense budget that included funds for the fighters, given questions about Taiwan’s credibility on arms purchases. Moreover, the Administration expressed disapproval in April 2007 about Taiwan’s domestic development of land-attack cruise missiles (see discussion below). Then, within days after the
LY’s passage of the 2007 defense budget in mid-June 2007, Taiwan President Chen proposed a referendum on membership in the U.N. under the name “Taiwan” to be held on the day of the
next presidential election (scheduled for March 22, 2008).
At a U.S.-Taiwan defense industry conference on September 10-11, 2007, at which there was concern about the persisting status of “no decision” on whether to consider Taiwan’s interest in new F-16s, the Administration issued a speech to stress U.S. opposition to this referendum while linking strength and moderation as two requirements for the broader and longer-term security of Taiwan.
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天佑吾「王」！ |
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cchs
路人甲乙丙
Taiwan
2212 Posts |
Posted - 05/23/2011 : 20:11:08
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阿扁與阿珍 有心無心下 把台灣的credit敗盡
百家姓? 幾家稱王? 幾家出將入相? 幾個人當過皇帝?
其實 典籍 寫得 很清楚
C4I R & D center CEO 2003~ |
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Captain Picard
我是老鳥
9669 Posts |
Posted - 06/16/2011 : 17:29:28
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Taiwan Submarines: At the Crossroads
http://thetaiwanlink.blogspot.com/2008/10/taiwan-and-its-40-year-quest-for.html
除了美國國會的研究報告，近年另一篇對台灣潛艦案的主要美方觀點，就是來自眾議院台灣連線（The Taiwan Link）的這篇文章。這大致上也是近年王志鵬主要的論點來源，把潛艦案停滯的主要責任歸咎於美國海軍的阻撓。
DoD Public Affairs statements made after the Bush decision, and other reporting, indicates that the intent was for the program to be carried out through direct commercial sales (DCS) channels, with licences to be release on a case-by-case basis. Up to that time, U.S. industry license requests associated with ROC submarines, including components for a potential domestic program, had been denied. Precedents for such an approach included a number of programs that were managed through DCS channels in the 1980s, including the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), the PFG-2 frigate, Tienkung air defense systems just to name a few. .............................The Report to Congress outlined the policy position of the U.S. Navy that remains valid until today - it had no desire to sponsor a diesel electric submarine through FMS channels.
在2001年小布希同意出售柴潛時，美國國防部傾向延續過去IDF、天弓、PFG2飛彈巡防艦的模式，使用商售管道（美國只負責發輸出許可，專案管理執行成敗選商等台灣自己扛）。
另外，國會報告顯示美國海軍沒有意願透過軍售（FMS）管道提供國外柴電潛艦。
Nevertheless, the Chen administration's submission of a letter of request for price and availability (P&A) in June 2001 for eight submarines formally placed the program in the hands of an institution that was ambivalent at best toward diesel electric submarines. In submitting its letter, the ROC request the program be managed through FMS channels, despite the U.S. Navy's policy position.
2001年6月扁政府向美國提出價格與可行性徵詢書（ request for price and availability）時，無視先前美國國防部的立場，堅持要走FMS軍售管道，由美國政府單位主導選商、研發整合、計畫管理等相關事宜。
由於這個潛艦沒有現成設計，相關選商與開發整合工作的主導權，自然委落到了美國海軍手中。明知山有虎，偏向虎山行.........
The U.S. Navy's suggestion that the ROCN required at least a 2000-ton boat, questionably more than what could be required for legitimate self-defense, has been said to have been a purposeful move by the Rickover nuclear navy community to jack up costs.
In its guidance to the contractors responsible for developing the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE), the US Navy's submarine program office wanted to "maximize risk," meaning gold plate the figures in a way to ensure sticker shock when the $11.7 billion was first briefed to the ROC Navy in December 2002. US Navy was said to be basing its program approach and costing on a similar basis as a Virginia, or other nuclear program. Without details on design and definition, Taiwan legislators across party lines rejected this approach, citing the exorbitant costs as compared with other diesel electric submarine projects around the world. Independent contractors in the United States challenged figures in ICE, and passed their own estimates of between US $3.5-5 billion.
在ICE計價過程中，美國海軍以2000噸最大型柴電潛艦為基準，以維吉尼亞級核子攻擊潛艦的高規格加上最高風險（maximize risk）原則，提出了117億美元的天價；而其他獨立的美國廠商的估價只有35到50億美元。
As debate raged in the LY over the Chen administration's refusal to integrate Taiwan's domestic industry into the program, and with an explicit LY threat to not authorize funding if there was no business for Taiwan industry, the U.S. Navy saw an opportunity - entange the program in the quagmire of Taiwan domestic politics and announce a policy that would forbid any role for Taiwan industry in the manufacturing of the submarines. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy would retain the intellectual property rights to any design that the ROC would fund.
隨後台灣掀起潛艦國造爭議，美國海軍看準了這點，堅持潛艦建造完全排除台灣，而且保留潛艦智慧財產權；由於立院多數席次的泛藍不可能接受，因此美國海軍就可以輕鬆地藉台灣內部政治力之手來癱瘓潛艦案。
In November 2005, as Taiwan continued to struggle domestically over the submarine and other programs, the Pacific Command Commander, ADM Fallon, was alleged to have discouraged Taiwan from going forward with the submarine program, though later publicly denied such a position. By February 2006, Janes Defense reported that Taiwan was claiming that the US Navy was subverting its plans to acquire US-built SSKs to protect its nuclear-powered submarine capability. As one source noted, "putting a diesel electric submarine programme in the hands of the US Navy is like putting an alcoholic in a brewery – the outcome won’t be good."
到2005年底至2006年，若干國外報導紛紛披露指責美國海軍間接阻撓台灣潛艦案，Janes Defense還引述台灣的指控美國以嚴苛條件阻撓，美國海軍自然一概予以否認。
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假設當年台灣很爺們地同意美國各種要求，不知道美國海軍核潛派還有沒有其他招式來阻撓此案推動？
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天佑吾「王」！ |
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Dr Evil
路人甲乙丙
Taiwan
4585 Posts |
Posted - 06/16/2011 : 17:54:27
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如果以上說法就是真相，歐耶！誰是阻擾潛艦的禍首要重新洗牌
還記得當時不少人為美國的天價作為解釋...沒想到...美國真是以如此高的規格蓄意作梗 |
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rockitten
我是老鳥
Australia
8191 Posts |
Posted - 06/16/2011 : 23:06:00
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quote:
Originally posted by Captain Picard
在2001年小布希同意出售柴潛時，美國國防部傾向延續過去IDF、天弓、PFG2飛彈巡防艦的模式，使用商售管道（美國只負責發輸出許可，專案管理執行成敗選商等台灣自己扛）。
另外，國會報告顯示美國海軍沒有意願透過軍售（FMS）管道提供國外柴電潛艦。
2001年6月扁政府向美國提出價格與可行性徵詢書（ request for price and availability）時，無視先前美國國防部的立場，堅持要走FMS軍售管道，由美國政府單位主導選商、研發整合、計畫管理等相關事宜。
由於這個潛艦沒有現成設計，相關選商與開發整合工作的主導權，自然委落到了美國海軍手中。明知山有虎，偏向虎山行.........
In its guidance to the contractors responsible for developing the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE), the US Navy's submarine program office wanted to "maximize risk," meaning gold plate the figures in a way to ensure sticker shock when the $11.7 billion was first briefed to the ROC Navy in December 2002. US Navy was said to be basing its program approach and costing on a similar basis as a Virginia, or other nuclear program. Without details on design and definition, Taiwan legislators across party lines rejected this approach, citing the exorbitant costs as compared with other diesel electric submarine projects around the world. Independent contractors in the United States challenged figures in ICE, and passed their own estimates of between US $3.5-5 billion.
在ICE計價過程中，美國海軍以2000噸最大型柴電潛艦為基準，以維吉尼亞級核子攻擊潛艦的高規格加上最高風險（maximize risk）原則，提出了117億美元的天價；而其他獨立的美國廠商的估價只有35到50億美元。
到2005年底至2006年，若干國外報導紛紛披露指責美國海軍間接阻撓台灣潛艦案，Janes Defense還引述台灣的指控美國以嚴苛條件阻撓，美國海軍自然一概予以否認。
////////////
假設當年台灣很爺們地同意美國各種要求，不知道美國海軍核潛派還有沒有其他招式來阻撓此案推動
USN will probably try to delay the design by US hasn't build any SSK for 50 years already. But as it is an order from the president, they have to get Taiwan the SSK, and that's probably why they assist Aussie's Collins class project just in case. And that's probably why 阿扁's insist on FMS: make sure this rare opportunity come up 8 good SSK.
其他獨立的美國廠商的估價只有35到50億美元 will only happens if: 1. There is no diplomatic barriers in acquiring those tech from Europe, 2. USN really want to assist, 3. Taiwanese navy know how to manage the project (including how to prepare the request of tender and contracts.....etc), which none of that is realistic (otherwise Taiwan can just go to buy type 214 from German). Consider how shit taiwan's defense tech in that field and project management, Taiwan will extremely got hijacked by the shipyard/suppliers/design firms if they go commercial sale and ended up even more expansive.............. or ended up with an extremely shit SSK.
小貓不會作模型，小貓只愛玩模型；看似小貓玩模型，其實模型玩小貓：
A B 補土白膠條，樹脂改套蝕刻片；凹線凸線凹凸線，乾磨水磨銼刀磨；
水性油性消光漆，乾掃手掃噴槍掃；模型一盒三百幾，零件一堆三千幾；
多買多作進步多，買了不作口水多；花錢耗時傷精神，小貓是隻敗家喵。 |
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Reinherd Von Hwang提督
我是老鳥
USA
9567 Posts |
Posted - 06/16/2011 : 23:13:54
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quote:
Originally posted by rockitten
其他獨立的美國廠商的估價只有35到50億美元 will only happens if: 1. There is no diplomatic barriers in acquiring those tech from Europe, 2. USN really want to assist, 3. Taiwanese navy know how to manage the project (including how to prepare the request of tender and contracts.....etc), which none of that is realistic (otherwise Taiwan can just go to buy type 214 from German). Consider how shit taiwan's defense tech in that field and project management, Taiwan will extremely got hijacked by the shipyard/suppliers/design firms if they go commercial sale and ended up even more expansive.............. or ended up with an extremely shit SSK.
小貓不會作模型，小貓只愛玩模型；看似小貓玩模型，其實模型玩小貓：
A B 補土白膠條，樹脂改套蝕刻片；凹線凸線凹凸線，乾磨水磨銼刀磨；
水性油性消光漆，乾掃手掃噴槍掃；模型一盒三百幾，零件一堆三千幾；
多買多作進步多，買了不作口水多；花錢耗時傷精神，小貓是隻敗家喵。
中共在1950年代搞R級潛艦計畫
也是一款extreme shit SSK
一直到1980年代才有線導魚雷以及反潛魚雷可供搭配
但是至少他們能夠在1960~70年代建立潛艦產能
建立自己的技術體系 (所以之後能夠以此為基礎開發下一代)
也培養出自己的人才進行新的潛艦計畫
所以 R級雖然很shit 但是對中共海軍/工業發展史來看 可能是diamond級的影響
所以對台灣來說
先有一款能用的潛艦比空中樓閣中的海蝙蝠號強
如果能夠大幅度參予計劃更好 就算只是北韓Yugo級的水準也好 |
Edited by - Reinherd Von Hwang提督 on 06/16/2011 23:17:44 |
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Captain Picard
我是老鳥
9669 Posts |
Posted - 06/16/2011 : 23:25:29
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>And that's probably why 阿扁's insist on FMS: make sure this rare opportunity come up 8 good SSK.
小弟認為台灣當時已經沒有足夠的專業能力去自己管理這個案子以及跟美國廠商打交道，尹清風案之後海軍武獲室
垮得差不多，人員幹部打掉一大批，肩膀跟LP都掉光了；當年從無到有的新設計，忠義計畫與ACS，兩個都失敗。
看來，真的只剩下花錢請美國海軍來為台灣做整個案子並且扛責任。
那幾個廠商獨立計價的確是姑且聽聽就好，沒說這是光八艘潛艦的價格，還是已經包含台灣所沒有的後勤維修、訓練、
通信站台等種種項目。 不過，美國海軍主導的造艦案，單價的確偏高。
=========================
天佑吾「王」！ |
Edited by - Captain Picard on 06/16/2011 23:30:51 |
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BlueWhaleMoon
我是老鳥
13032 Posts |
Posted - 06/16/2011 : 23:50:00
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quote:
Originally posted by rockitten
USN will probably try to delay the design by US hasn't build any SSK for 50 years already. But as it is an order from the president, they have to get Taiwan the SSK, and that's probably why they assist Aussie's Collins class project just in case. And that's probably why 阿扁's insist on FMS: make sure this rare opportunity come up 8 good SSK.
其他獨立的美國廠商的估價只有35到50億美元
117億美元 vs 35到50億美元, 這真是戳到台灣人買東西的要害, 我覺的很難讓大部份民眾支持117億美元
John F. Kennedy Quotes:
The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender, or submission.
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BlueWhaleMoon
我是老鳥
13032 Posts |
Posted - 06/16/2011 : 23:51:24
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quote:
Originally posted by Reinherd Von Hwang提督
中共在1950年代搞R級潛艦計畫
也是一款extreme shit SSK
一直到1980年代才有線導魚雷以及反潛魚雷可供搭配
所以對台灣來說
先有一款能用的潛艦比空中樓閣中的海蝙蝠號強
如果能夠大幅度參予計劃更好 就算只是北韓Yugo級的水準也好
等等, 這是說要台灣自己建立SS研發建造能量? 不是不好, 但是人民願意買單嗎? |
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GMM
路人甲乙丙
3333 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 00:02:06
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勉強建立以後,能像飛彈快艇一樣灌香腸嗎
而且老美好像也沒打算讓台灣有這個能力
只肯在美國國內製造救救他們的失業率
台灣組裝應該只是台灣政客在做夢吧 |
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rockitten
我是老鳥
Australia
8191 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 00:03:41
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quote:
Originally posted by Captain Picard
>And that's probably why 阿扁's insist on FMS: make sure this rare opportunity come up 8 good SSK.
小弟認為台灣當時已經沒有足夠的專業能力去自己管理這個案子以及跟美國廠商打交道，尹清風案之後海軍武獲室
垮得差不多，人員幹部打掉一大批，肩膀跟LP都掉光了；當年從無到有的新設計，忠義計畫與ACS，兩個都失敗。
看來，真的只剩下花錢請美國海軍來為台灣做整個案子並且扛責任。
那幾個廠商獨立計價的確是姑且聽聽就好，沒說這是光八艘潛艦的價格，還是已經包含台灣所沒有的後勤維修、訓練、
通信站台等種種項目。 不過，美國海軍主導的造艦案，單價的確偏高。
without assistance from USN, taiwanese navy is very likely not even able to write up a good tech spec for the request of tender.....
actually, one thing about better get it through FMS is that, US government have to guarentee the availability of the supply and spares of those SSK (usually for 10 years at fixed price) unless US decleared weapon embargo to that nation, which, if Taiwan get it through commercial sale, it come with an extremely high risk for supply/spare cut-off by chi na's political pressure on the manufacturers
USN don't want that project comes true, of coz they will exaggerate the unit price, but remember, for taiwan, SSK is so hard to get even if you willing to pay more, now you have a chance, I will surely go for it if I am Taiwan government......
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now even if President Ma wanna pay that 117億美元 for the 8 SSK, he probably can't get it.........
小貓不會作模型，小貓只愛玩模型；看似小貓玩模型，其實模型玩小貓：
A B 補土白膠條，樹脂改套蝕刻片；凹線凸線凹凸線，乾磨水磨銼刀磨；
水性油性消光漆，乾掃手掃噴槍掃；模型一盒三百幾，零件一堆三千幾；
多買多作進步多，買了不作口水多；花錢耗時傷精神，小貓是隻敗家喵。 |
Edited by - rockitten on 06/17/2011 00:07:43 |
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rockitten
我是老鳥
Australia
8191 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 00:17:37
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quote:
Originally posted by GMM
勉強建立以後,能像飛彈快艇一樣灌香腸嗎
而且老美好像也沒打算讓台灣有這個能力
只肯在美國國內製造救救他們的失業率
台灣組裝應該只是台灣政客在做夢吧
as long as those key equipments (periscope, sensors, combat system, weapon, batteries, diesel engines or even the head and tail of the hull (less than 10 nations able to make that section because of the complex shape)........... are unable to manufacture in Taiwan, then台灣組裝 =/= 台灣自己建立SSK研發建造能量 .........
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even if Taiwan want to "台灣自己建立SSK研發建造能量" they should still get that 8 SSK so to get the idea what a good SSK should be (and set that as a benchmark)
小貓不會作模型，小貓只愛玩模型；看似小貓玩模型，其實模型玩小貓：
A B 補土白膠條，樹脂改套蝕刻片；凹線凸線凹凸線，乾磨水磨銼刀磨；
水性油性消光漆，乾掃手掃噴槍掃；模型一盒三百幾，零件一堆三千幾；
多買多作進步多，買了不作口水多；花錢耗時傷精神，小貓是隻敗家喵。 |
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BlueWhaleMoon
我是老鳥
13032 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 01:24:29
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| 我想海軍應該覺的海龍海虎夠好了.. |
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dasha
版主
41804 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 10:11:35
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quote:
Originally posted by GMM
勉強建立以後,能像飛彈快艇一樣灌香腸嗎
而且老美好像也沒打算讓台灣有這個能力
只肯在美國國內製造救救他們的失業率
台灣組裝應該只是台灣政客在做夢吧
由於美國海軍不要SSK的立場,台灣組裝不是不可能,當年連IDF都搞了,只是SSK最後沒有搞好...... |
Edited by - dasha on 06/17/2011 10:12:14 |
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Dr Evil
路人甲乙丙
Taiwan
4585 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 11:32:25
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美國真要賣給你東西，真的要塞給你!他們會很積極，懂得頭過身就過的道理
當初賣愛國者時，眼見台灣方面有質疑聲浪，美國方面就很變通
潛艦案卻一開始就用高標高姿態的估價，用這種方式作生意不是傻子就是別有用心
還是那句話，真的很想賣給你，先騙你上勾再說，頭過∼身就過
有時想想樂山的安邦計畫後來一再追加經費，是不是就是當初這樣造成的
或是因為我們砍掉一座~打亂美方原本的部局，用這樣的方式賺回來?
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Edited by - Dr Evil on 06/17/2011 11:42:54 |
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小毛
我是老鳥
Taiwan
10742 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 11:51:02
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或許該想想萬一那八艘潛艦無望或是根本買不起的時候，有沒有替代方案？像是P-3C，像是更多有反潛能力的中大型艦艇？海巡艦艇也搞被動聲納？鋪設更多海底監聽系統？岸基火箭助推魚雷？甚至是太陽能海上監聽浮標啥的。
海龍海虎 MLU?
** 小毛的新幻想空間逐漸復活中.....**
http://lordmrx.pixnet.net/blog
歡迎參觀 |
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dasha
版主
41804 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 12:36:44
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| 基本上,SS(含SSN/SSBN與USV)是僅有的水下攻擊載具,其它方式都是水下防禦載具.以台灣的態勢,只有地對地飛彈可以視為SS的替代品,把戰爭帶離本土到敵人門口,打亂敵人作戰步調的替代品.甚至,倒過來,美國不提供台灣彈道/巡弋飛彈,就提供SS當替代品...... |
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toga
版主
Tajikistan
12781 Posts |
Posted - 06/17/2011 : 13:46:29
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美國海軍117億美金的成本預估和老美廠商50億美金報價預估所涵蓋的範圍是否相同，本身便不無疑問。
老美軍火廠商對自家軍武產品之對外報價宣傳通常只侷限於”自己生產製造”的部分，所以波音宣傳自家超蟲的單位造價低於5,000萬美金，LM則堅稱聯打閃電的預定單價至今仍保持在低於6,000萬美金∼然而若客戶真按照上述價碼付錢的話，將會得到一架沒引擎沒雷達沒主要電子裝備的地面展覽品，因為上述行頭皆非波音／LM製造，得另外付錢採購；而等到你能引進一架”真正完整”的超蟲或聯閃時，所付出的實際價碼已經差不多是上述廠商報價的兩倍左右，如果要再加上相關後勤補保／人員訓練／基本武裝配備等配套，所付出的代價則至少是上述廠商報價的四倍。
所以老美廠商所謂的50億美金報價預估，指的是從無到有，八艘全新研發且配備完整的傳統柴電潛艇？還是用1950年代老美末代柴電設計為藍圖基礎，不含許多必要配套（動力推進／聲納戰系／電子裝備／武器系統等等....）之殘缺柴潛價碼？不無疑問。
老美海軍或許是不甚樂意協助台灣籌獲柴電潛艇，但很可能也因此其所提出的成本預估才是真正反應現實，好讓我方知難而退∼畢竟論誤上老美軍火商賊船惡當經驗之豐，有誰能與老美海軍相提並論？原本應該要比海狼級SSN便宜25%的維吉尼亞級SSN的造價最後搞成是海狼級SSN的250%，排水量14,000噸級的DDG-1000之身價暴漲成和排水量40,000噸級現代中型航空母艦有得拼，原本單價該低於3億美金的LCS濱海作戰艦最後搞成單價從5億美金起跳.......擁有如此輝煌過往成本控制成就的老美軍火造船商現在告訴台灣只要50億美金就能從無到有，以和目前預定生產50多艘LCS差不多的單位成本搞定8艘全新研發生產柴電？其原始設計藍圖依據可別說是迪士尼遊樂園潛艇啊.....XD
一萌二PAK三聯閃，四代歐風五國潘，十全側衛百戰鷹，成千蟲隼萬國繁。 |
Edited by - toga on 06/17/2011 15:44:26 |
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對台灣潛艦案的簡單分析（個人觀點）
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